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INTRODUCTION 
Over the years there has been a considerable amount of 
controversy on the use of technical analysis as a method of 
timing the purchase and sale of investments. Academicians 
have dismissed the various chartist theories, Eugene F. Fama 
in "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices" said that "chart 
reading, though perhaps an interesting pastime, is of no real 
value to the stock market investor" (34). However, the 
chartists have not been deterred from trying to time the 
market in their pursuit of increased gains. 
As early as 1900, there was interest in market 
forecasting, however, it was limited to a small number of 
people, mostly in the east, who used tape-reading and figure 
charts. The market during this time period was low volume and 
often manipulated by the owners of the few listed companies. 
Thus, tape watchers could observe the buys and sells of these 
owners and distinguish patterns that gave insight into what to 
expect. Figure charting was also popular as a method to 
estimate future prices. These charts depicted the intra-day 
price moves and were used to study price changes at a trend 
reversal. 
Around 1920, production statistics became increasingly 
important to market forecasting. Colonel Ayres' "Blast 
Furnace Index" was one well-known business indicator. The 
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fundamentals of this index were "when the average rate of 
blast furnaces in operation crossed 60% on the way up, the 
market was high enough to be sold, and when it crossed 60% on 
the way down, the price level was low enough to be bought" 
(Drew 11). The danger in any forecasting method is that what 
is valid in one time period may not be valid in another, a 
case in point being the Blast Furnace Index. It is possible 
to take almost any series of changing figures and by suiting 
various statistical adjustments to the known facts, arrive at 
something approximating what would have been a "forecast" of 
the stock market. 
The various technical indicators rely on the basic 
assumption that inherent in past price information and trends 
lies the future. Technicians believe that the "stock market 
is oligopolistic in nature, and there is thus an unequal 
distribution of critical information throughout the market 
place" that produces patterns and trends in prices that 
indicate the future (Levy 69). Thus, by careful analysis, the 
chartist can use the past data and extrapolate the patterns to 
increase expected gains. The stumbling block, however, seems 
to be that, as always, there are exceptions to the rule. 
While history tends to repeat itself, it is not one hundred 
percent reliable, and the patterns are not consistently 
dependable. 
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The antithesis of technical analysis is the efficient 
market hypothesis which is grounded in the Random Walk Theory. 
This random walk says that past price data is of no value in 
trying to predict the future course of a stock's price. "In 
statistical terms the theory says that successive price 
changes are independent, identically distributed random 
variables" (Fama, Behavior 34). In other words, a market that 
is functioning properly will have capital assets that are 
priced accurately based on all relevant and available 
information (Fama, Efficient 418) . 
This paper will review literature on both the efficient 
market hypothesis and technical analysis and then attempt to 
empirically test the opposing views by analyzing ten stocks 
over a four and one-half year period comparing their returns 




EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been an 
intensely researched investment topic. An efficient market is 
one where prices fully reflect all information, an ideal 
setting for both firms and investors where production, 
investment, and ownership decisions can be made with a high 
degree of certainty. While not absolutely necessary, the 
following conditions are assumptions that Eugene Fama believes 
assure market efficiency: no transaction costs, all 
information is costless and available to all market 
participants, and all participants agree on the implications 
of information for the current price and for distributions of 
future prices (Efficient 387). Unfortunately, reality does 
not provide such a frictionless market; however, as long as 
investors assimilate the available information, prices will 
fully reflect that knowledge. Some potential sources of 
market inefficiency occur when information is not freely 
available or if some investors consistently display superior 
interpretive skills (Fama, Efficient 388) . 
The EMH's general form is that the "size and direction of 
a stock price change at time t+1 is random with respect to 
information set S at t" (Sorensen 29). (If S is historical 
stock prices, then it is the weak form of the EMH. If all 
publicly available information is S, then we have the semi- 
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strong form, and if S is equal to all information then we are 
dealing with the strong form of the EMH.) The random change 
occurs as a result of new information that is immediately 
reflected in the stock price. In other words, price changes 
are the result of perceived earnings changes or changes in the 
expected return of alternate investments because of the new 
information. 
Weak, Semi-Strong, Strong Forms 
Since it is unrealistic to believe that frictionless 
markets exist, the evidence on EMH has been categorized into 
three distinct forms, weak, semi-strong, and strong, allowing 
definite break-points for analysis. 
Weak Form The weak form of the EMH defines the 
relevant information set as historical prices. There have 
been a considerable number of tests on the weak form with most 
results supporting the notion; thus within academic circles, 
weak form is a decided issue. Many researchers liken weak 
form EMH testing with technical analysis, they believe that 
technical analysis is contrary to basic economic logic and 
that this fact is demonstrated in the weak form testing that 
has consistently proven that price changes are independent 
over time. While there is some evidence for dependence in 
price changes, it does not seem to be sufficient to rule that 
the market is inefficient, especially if the price change 
covers a period of at least one day or longer. The dependence 
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is apparent in the filter tests of Sidney S. Alexander 
considered later in this paper. However, as will be 
explained, trading profits are eaten up by the numerous 
transaction fees that are an integral part of any filter 
method (Fama, Efficient 414). 
Joy and Jones (51) criticize the dismissal of technical 
analysis based on the weak form testing. They assert: 
1. There is not a one-to-one mapping between weak 
form analysis and technical analysis. 
2. Many weak form tests are not direct tests of 
specific forms of technical analysis. 
Joy and Jones contend that while tests of weak form 
support the EMH, these tests are not conclusive as they relate 
to technical analysis since technical analysis is broader than 
just past price changes. Past prices are just one type of 
data and little study has been done on the volume data which 
is jointly analyzed with price information as a form of market 
timing. Thus, it is incorrect to conclude that technical 
analysis is invalid based on the weak form tests. 
Sweeney (New 299) questions the weak form, his studies 
have found that, at least at floor traders level of 
transaction costs, the market is weak-form inefficient. He 
offers three explanations for this phenomenon: 1) the value 
of a seat on the exchange is equal to the present value of the 
profits available; 2) opportunity costs of implementing the 
rules reduce the profits available; 3) Traders, other than 
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floor traders, move the market against themselves while trying 
to consummate the trade. 
Semi-Strong The semi-strong form of the EMH asserts 
that publicly available information is reflected in price 
changes. Tests of this form of market efficiency also support 
the EMH. However, the tests generally only consider one type 
of information at a time, for example, annual earnings or 
stock splits; thus, one must accumulate the results of each 
test to check the validity of the semi-strong form model. 
Fama reports on the results of tests of several different 
types of information (annual earnings, new issues, stock 
splits) and concludes that the results indicate market 
efficiency (Efficient 415). The Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and 
Roll test on stock splits found that it may not be the splits 
themselves that motivate price changes but rather the 
accompanying information. They studied returns around the 
date of the splits to see what generated the price changes and 
found that the price appears to adjust when the split is 
declared, probably in anticipation of an increase in future 
dividends (Fama, Efficient 407). In conclusion, they found 
that the stock market is efficient as it adjusts to stock 
split information. 
Other tests that support the semi-strong efficient 
markets hypothesis, are Ball and Brown who studied annual 
earnings announcements. They concluded that eighty-five to 
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ninety percent of the information content in earnings reports 
is incorporated into prices by the month of the announcement. 
Discount rate changes by the Federal Reserve Banks were 
studied by Waud with findings that the market appears to 
anticipate the news since prices tend to adjust in the days 
preceding the announcement. By the first trading day after an 
announcement the price adjustment is inconsequential (Fama, 
Efficient 408). 
Scholes also tested the semi-strong form by looking at 
large secondary offerings and concluded that the prices appear 
to adjust because of the negative information implicit in the 
selling of a large block of stock. Prices adjust an even 
greater amount if the seller is the company itself, even 
though the seller's identity is not public information prior 
to the time that the prices adjust (Fama, Efficient 409) , a 
fact that is indicative of insider information or information 
leaks. 
Robert A. Schwartz, (Fama, Efficient 422) disagrees 
somewhat with Fama's conclusion that the market is efficient 
in the semi-strong form. He states that while "anticipatory 
price adjustments do indicate that, on average, new 
information is quickly gleaned and responded to by the 
investment community" there does appear to be some monopoly 
position for the trader because the early receipt of 
information gives him control. While the monopoly position is 
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only transitory, persistently early information seems to 
suggest that the trader has a market advantage which is 
inconsistent with the semi-strong form. The length of time it 
requires for the market to adjust may also suggest 
inefficiency. Schwartz continues that even Fama finds some 
dependence in prices (although Fama says that it is not 
sufficient to reject the Efficient Market Hypothesis) and 
until there are no further tests to be conducted, the question 
of an efficient market is far from settled (Fama Efficient 
423) . 
Schwartz believes that if a specific stock's price is 
volatile and appears to behave in a consistent fashion over a 
period of time, a trader may be able to gain excess profits by 
utilizing the information contained in the consistency. He 
might be able to do so "not on the basis of expectations of a 
specific directional price change, but rather on the 
expectation that one stock's price is simply more apt to 
change than another's" (Fama, Efficient 423). 
"In all tests cited, stock prices appear to react prior 
to the event in issue. Therefore, it is observed that prices 
"incorporate, fully and early, new information of the type 
considered in these studies" (Fama, Efficient 421), leading 
to the conclusion that the market is efficient in the semi¬ 
strong form. 
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Strong Form Finally, strong form market efficiency 
denies the possibility that certain groups or investors have 
access to information that is neither publicly available nor 
reflected in prices (Fama, Efficient 414). Tests of the 
strong form try to determine if all available information is 
fully reflected in prices so that no one can have higher 
expected profits because of monopolistic information. Fama 
does not believe that the strong-form accurately describes the 
market although it could be used as a "benchmark against which 
the importance of deviations from market efficiency can be 
judged" (Fama, Efficient 414-415). Two such deviations are: 
1) Niederhoffer and Osborne's reports that specialists on 
exchanges have monopolistic information concerning limit 
orders and use this information to create trading profits, and 
2) Scholes reports that corporate insiders have capitalized on 
information to make excess profits. Fama asserts that: 
corporate insiders and specialists are the only two 
groups whose monopolistic access to information has 
been documented. There is no evidence that 
deviations from the strong form of the efficient 
markets permeate down any further through the 
investment community. For the purposes of most 
investors the efficient markets model seems a good 
first (and second) approximation to reality 
(Efficient 415-416). 
Expected Return or Fair Game Models 
Most empirical testing of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
has been carried out within the context of the Expected Return 
or Fair Game models. These models are based on the two 
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following assumptions, 1) market equilibrium can be stated in 
terms of expected returns and 2) information is fully utilized 
in forming equilibrium expected returns and thus current 
prices. There are concerns regarding these assumptions since 
one must define "true expected value" and "fully reflected," 
concepts which can be measured by many different criteria. 
One Expected Return or Fair Game model that has been 
rigorously studied is the Random Walk. 
Random Walk Around 1890, Louis Bachelier first stated 
and tested the Random Walk model in his provocative paper 
"Theory of Speculation." His "'fundamental principle' for the 
behavior of prices was that speculation should be a 'fair 
game'; in particular, the expected profits to the speculator 
should be zero" (Fama, Efficient 389). Under the fair game 
principle, trading systems that produce greater than normal 
profits are impossible. A random walk: 
arises within the context of such a model when the 
environment is (fortuitously) such that the 
evolution of investor tastes and the process of 
generating new information combine to produce 
equilibria in which return distributions repeat 
themselves through time. (Fama, Efficient 387) 
Early evidence accumulated that pointed to a random walk 
where prices reflected all information and that successive 
price changes were identically distributed. This means that 
the market is efficiently competitive with sufficient 
sophisticated traders to cause instantaneous price adjustments 
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that reflect intrinsic security values. Thus, stock price 
variations are aimless and future prices are unpredictable. 
The random walk implication that stock prices do not 
contain predictive information means that effective analysts 
are unable to earn extraordinary profits and that technical 
analysis based on past prices can not succeed in determining 
future price trends. This hypothesis is not viewed favorably 
by investment professionals but it is strongly adhered to by 
academicians. 
In 1953, Maurice G. Kendall studied prices and concluded 
that the price "series looks like a wandering one, almost as 
if once a week the Demon of Chance drew a random number...and 
added it to the current price to determine the next week's 
price" (Fama, Efficient 390). Other tests also concluded that 
price changes appeared to follow a random walk. Paul Cootner 
reasoned that investors would force prices up if they bought 
when they believed the prices were too low. 
Except for appreciation due to earnings retention, 
the conditional expectation of tomorrow's price, 
given today's price, is today's price... since there 
is no reason to expect that information to be non- 
random in appearance, the period-to-period price 
changes of a stock should be random movements. 
(Fama, Efficient 390) 
In the broad form, the Random Walk Theory states that 
"fundamental analysis of publicly available information cannot 
produce investment recommendations that will enable an 
investor consistently to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy in 
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managing a portfolio" (Malkiel 168). Because intelligent 
investors discount new information so quickly it is extremely 
difficult to realize excess profits by utilizing fundamental 
analysis. The narrow form goes even further by asserting that 
technical analysis is also useless to investors since all 
knowledge is immediately reflected in prices. 
A random walk does not suggest that prices are unaffected 
by changes in the fundamentals of a company. Just the 
opposite is true, a random walk signifies that new information 
is so quickly disseminated that it is virtually impossible for 
anyone to consistently benefit. In fact, the growing 
sophistication of investors almost insures that prices will 
reflect all new information, therefore, random forecasts of 
the market will provide as accurate an estimate as those 
reached through either fundamental or technical analysis. 
According to Fama (Behavior 35), the Theory of Random 
Walks is based on two hypotheses. The first is that price 
changes are independent and the second is that these changes 
in price follow some probability distribution. Statistically, 
independence of prices means that "knowledge of the sequence 
of price changes leading up to time period ' t' is of no help 
in assessing the probability distribution for the price change 
during time period 't2'" (Behavior 35). Fama continues, 
however, that the random walk is not a totally accurate 
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picture of reality since nothing is ever perfect. Thus some 
dependence will be found, although it should be at a minimum. 
The minimum acceptable level of dependence, according to 
Fama (Behavior 35), depends on the point of view being 
considered. For the statistician conducting tests on 
successive price changes, if the dependence can not account 
for the property being tested, then the assumption of 
independence can be justified. On the other hand, a 
technician will use very practical rules in determining 
dependence, such as can the knowledge of past price changes be 
used to increase return. The investor would be willing to 
accept the Random Walk Theory if the degree of dependence 
could not be used to produce greater expected profits than a 
buy-and-hold policy (Fama, Filter 226). Thus, what is 
"important from a trader's point of view need not be important 
from a statistical point of view, and conversely dependence 
which is important for statistical purposes need not be 
important for investment purposes" (Fama, Behavior 35). 
There are many views to explain price independence that 
are consistent with the Random Market Hypothesis. One of the 
least appealing views regarding independence in price changes 
is that stock prices are the result of randomly generated 
noise. Noise meaning the psychological and other factors that 
cause investors to purchase stocks in different companies. In 
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other words, prices are unrelated to economic and political 
events. 
Another view of price independence is that many investors 
look for the intrinsic value of a stock in determining its 
fair price. The Random Walk Theory can be consistent with this 
idea only if it is understood that while prices usually 
reflect the intrinsic value of the security which depends on 
the earning prospects of the company which in turn are 
affected by economic and political factors, prices do not have 
to actually reflect intrinsic value and probably will not 
since we live in an uncertain world where individual investors 
analyze and reach conclusions that are inconsistent. Another 
reason that actual values are in a state of constant flux is 
that new information from research, changes in market forces, 
governmental factors, etc., is constantly being disseminated 
(Fama, Behavior 36). 
Fama cites Bachelier as proposing another, simpler 
argument for the independence assumption. 
If successive bits of new information 
arise independently across time, and if 
noise or uncertainty concerning intrinsic 
values does not tend to follow any 
consistent pattern, then successive price 
changes in common stock will be 
independent. (Fama, Behavior 37). 
In other words, if new information is independent and the 
noise concerning intrinsic value is independent then prices 
are independent. Fama continues, however, that this is too 
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simplistic a view because there are opinion leaders that 
influence the market and there is a tendency for good news to 
follow good news, or bad new to follow bad news, all instances 
causing price dependence (Fama, Behavior 1965) . 
Even if there is dependence in the information or noise 
causing price dependence, "sophisticated traders in general 
feel that actual prices usually tend to move toward intrinsic 
values" or equilibrium (Fama, Behavior 38) thus the market can 
over-ride the dependencies and produce independent prices. 
For this to occur, there must be many sophisticated traders 
that have superior analytical skills who can predict the 
effect of new information on price behavior. Therefore, when 
noise causes prices to be above or below their intrinsic value 
the sophisticated traders evaluate the intrinsic value and 
neutralize the noise by trading in the opposite direction and 
thereby causing the prices to be independent. Thus, the 
sophisticated traders erase the dependencies and bring the 
price back to intrinsic value. 
Over a period of time new information may arrive that 
causes prices to over-adjust or under-adjust and creates a lag 
before the new intrinsic value is evident. If the new 
information is dependent, the prices tend to be dependent, but 
again, sophisticated traders that are able to interpret the 
information effect on prices will negate the dependency. 
Since intrinsic values are not exactly known, the intrinsic 
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value and actual security price may be different because the 
actual value is affected by the noise (disagreement among 
investors about the intrinsic value). Where there is a lag in 
reaching intrinsic value chartists may be able to accumulate 
excess returns; however, this lag is an independent variable 
(Fama, Behavior 39) . 
Fama continues that while chartist's may aid in creating 
independence of prices, once the independence is established 
then charting becomes ineffective. On the other hand, 
intrinsic-value analysts who can consistently "predict the 
appearance of new information and evaluate its effect on 
intrinsic values will usually make more profits than can 
people who do not have this talent" (Fama, Behavior 39). 
Again, however, with enough analysts capable of consistently 
estimating the impact of new information, the ability becomes 
useless since prices will always reflect true intrinsic values 
and because there are no lags, there will be no profits to 
make, rather prices will instantaneously reflect the new 
information. 
The second hypothesis to the Random Walk Model is less 
important than the independence hypothesis. This second 
hypothesis is that price changes conform to some probability 
distribution. The shape of the distribution does not have to 
be specified so any distribution is accurate if it describes 
18 
the price changing process. To an investor, however, the 
shape can be helpful in determining the riskiness of a stock. 
Different models to explain the probability distributions 
have been based on the assumption that the price changes have 
normal or Gaussian distributions. Empirical tests have shown, 
however, that "most of the distributions of prices changes are 
leptokurtic; that is, there are too many values near the mean 
and too many out in the extreme tails" (Fama, Behavior 42). 
The leptokurtosis does not support the normality hypothesis. 
Generally, this problem has been explained away by assuming 
that extreme values are a result of extenuating actions that 
can be ignored. However, to the investor, this equates to an 
unassessed risk that needs to be considered before committing 
funds. 
With the advent of the computer, more rigorous testing 
was possible. Two statistical methods of testing the Random 
Walk Theory are serial correlation studies which test the 
relationship of successive security prices and runs analyses 
that compares the length of actual price runs with a 
mathematically determined expected length of runs. 
Robert A. Levy (70) suggests that tests of the Random 
Walk Theory using serial correlation or runs analyses are 
insufficient because of serious methodological deficiencies 
such as: 
1. Inability to distinguish nonlinear patterns 
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2. Difficulty in interpretation 
3. Rigidity with regard to the size of the price 
change 
4. Difficulty in measuring risk 
5. Nonfiltering of co-movement effects 
Joy and Jones also criticize correlation studies as being 
indirect tests that "do not lend themselves directly to 
economic inference regarding EMH validity" (51). 
Levy (70) proposes using simulation to avoid the 
statistical tests' weaknesses. However, because of the large 
amount of data that must be manipulated, a computer is 
necessary. Simulations put a trading strategy into practice, 
determine the results of utilizing the strategy, and compare 
the results with a strategy of random investment selection. 
Simulation avoids the pitfalls of serial correlation and runs 
analysis since it can detect non-linear patterns, test for 
relative strength which filters out co-movements, and it can 
assimilate the effects of brokerage commissions. The results 
of simulations are also expressed in dollars and cents and it 
provides for a measure of risk. 
Conclusion of EMH 
The numerous tests of market efficiency have concluded 
that empirical studies produce support for the Random Walk 
Model. While there is some indication that large price 
changes may be followed by large prices changes and there is a 
probability that a positive (negative) change today will 
result in a positive (negative) change tomorrow, there is no 
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evidence of any dependence that would aid investors, 
especially as one tries to predict further into the future 
(Fama and Blume 238). Fama even suggests that this only means 
that new information cannot be evaluated immediately thus the 
price may over- or under-adjust initially but in the following 
days the price changes are random in sign and are, therefore, 
impartial price adjustments created by the effects of the 
information. He further notes that while this represents a 
denial of the random walk it does not negate the Market 
Efficiency Hypothesis (Fama, Efficient 396). Thus, past price 
changes can not be used to provide greater expected profits. 
Malkiel (171) raises some concerns regarding certain 
random walk assumptions. He believes that the market has 
proven too often that stocks do not always sell at anyone's 
evaluation of price especially during periods of speculation 
where prices ride wide swings and no one is able to pin down 
the true intrinsic value. Also of concern is the presumption 
that news travels instantaneously to everyone and that no 
investor wields monopolistic power in the market. Malkiel 
asserts that there are too many powerful brokerage firms that 
are considered market leaders who can, at least for a time, 
provide self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Robert Ferguson goes beyond questioning the possibility 
of an efficient market, he ridicules the concept. Ferguson 
states "the fact is that market efficiency is implausible on 
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the basis of common sense experience" (31) and continues with 
examples of investors who displayed advantages in information, 
analysis, judgment, and idiosyncratic behavior and were able 
to benefit from their abilities at the expense of other less 
capable traders. 
If the market truly follows a random path, then the 
average investor's decisions are simplified. The investor can 
add a randomly selected security from a specific risk class 
and, on the average, any security so chosen will have about 
the same effect on the expected return and riskiness of his 
portfolio as one chosen using any other method (Fama, Behavior 
40) . 
In summary, the Random Walk Hypothesis can not be proven 
by statistics or simulation. The only assertion that can be 
made is that the technical strategies tested do not yield 





Technical analysis is a category of trading techniques 
that attempts to forecast prices through the use of past price 
information and a few other statistics about security trading 
such as volume. Technicians believe they can detect market 
supply and demand in the charts. Technical analysis came into 
use long before financial information was publicly available 
that allowed fundamental analysis, with the Dow Theory 
probably being the oldest technique dating back to the late 
1800s. Many of the techniques in use today have been around 
for many years. These techniques look for relationships in 
stock prices. 
The fundamental premise of technical analysis is to 
identify and predict the movements of market trends, to 
evaluate market relative strength or weakness, and to profit 
from the application of that analysis. A pure technical 
approach disdains the use of fundamental data that contains 
facts "relating to the market, but external to it," because it 
is believed that by the time the fundamental data is public, 
it is already reflected in the stock price (Drew 21). 
By applying superior analytical skills to public facts, 
insights are gained that provide opportunities for profit as 
long as the investor's analysis is correct on two counts: 
"first, the estimate of the worth of the information must be 
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reasonably accurate in terms of its impact on the price of the 
stock, and second, the investor must make a realistic 
assessment of the likelihood that the market already has 
received the information or insight in question" (Treynor and 
Ferguson 757). 
A plot of past unique returns will aid in determining if 
the market has already received the information. A recent 
spike in the unique returns will denote that the market has 
already assimilated the information and the investor will know 
that this information is valueless. If the unique returns do 
not display a recent spike, the investor can assume the 
information still has value and that it is possible to gain 
from it. Treynor and Ferguson clearly state that "it is the 
nonprice information that creates the opportunity. The past 
prices serve only to permit its efficient exploitation" (773). 
The attitude of academics towards technical analysis, 
until recently, is well described by Malkiel: 
Obviously, I am biased against the 
chartist. This is not only a personal 
predilection, but a professional one as 
well. Technical analysis is anathema to 
the academic world. We love to pick on 
it. Our bullying tactics are prompted by 
two considerations: (1) the method is 
patently false; and (2) it's easy to pick 
on. And while it may seem a bit unfair to 
pick on such a sorry target, just 
remember; it is your money we are trying 
to save (116) . 
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Others in the academic world also disagree with technical 
analysis based on comparisons of the buy-and-hold strategy and 
the whip-saw argument. Glickstein and Wubbels (29) dismiss 
the arguments, however, stating that a buy-and-hold strategy 
from January 2, 1971, to December 31, 1980, would have had 
average capital appreciation of 1.6% per annum compared to the 
average capital appreciation of 14.6% per annum if trading had 
occurred based on the Dow Theory. For the same ten-year 
period the whip-saw argument, which states that "those who 
trade based on technical indicators are liable to get in too 
late on the upside and to get out too late on the downside," 
did not hold up either. Only two instances were noted where 
trading based on the technical indicators would have created a 
loss. The greatest loss, which was less than three percent, 
was June 14, 1976, to August 20, 1976. Based on these 
findings they feel that the whip-saw and buy-and-hold 
arguments are not material. 
Even with all the controversy, technical analysis has 
been enjoying a renaissance on Wall Street. All major 
brokerage firms publish technical commentary on the market and 
individual securities, and many of the newsletters published 
by various "experts" are based on technical analysis. 
Indicators 
Before the computer age, technical analysis was confined 
to drawing charts of prices and analyzing the patterns and 
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formations on those charts. With the appearance of computers, 
especially personal computers, technicians began inventing new 
methods that attempted to measure things that had previously 
been nonmeasurable, such as how overbought a market was, the 
strength of its current trend, or the prospect of a change in 
trend. These studies have evolved into indicators that serve 
as important technical trading tools. 
Alexander Elder (Heeding 36) believes that even "bad" 
trading signals relay vital information. When a normally 
reliable indicator does not work, he calls it "The Hound of 
the Baskervilles" signal that tells you a "major shift is 
taking place under the surface of the market and it is better 
to reverse a trading position." 
Generally, indicators only work "for a short period of 
time and probably only for a certain kind of market" (Crim 
73). Thus, technicians should use a variety of methods and 
never rely solely on one. All indicators are either trend¬ 
following indicators or oscillators. The first category 
includes moving averages, filters, and the directional system; 
oscillators which identify market overbought and oversold 
areas include rate of change, momentum, moving average 
convergence-divergence (MACD), Relative Strength Index and 
stochastic. Some terms used with technical indicators are: 
Overbought - the market is overextended to the upside and 
ready to turn down. 
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Oversold - the market is overextended to the downside and 
ready to turn up. 
Divergence - higher price tops with lower indicator tops 
is bearish divergence. Lower price bottoms with higher 
indicator bottoms is bullish divergence. 
Oscillators - the difference between two moving averages 
that measures and quantifies momentum. They are usually 
setup as differences or ratios that move above and below 
a threshold or signal point of zero or one. When the 
oscillator crosses the signal point, the two moving 
averages have crossed. Oscillators are also used to give 
indications of overbought/oversold conditions, initiating 
trades at certain extreme positive or negative areas 
(Stein, Traders' 27). 
Momentum - the velocity or speed at which a data series 
is moving. 
Dow Theory The oldest method of assessing stock 
market price trends is the Dow Theory. Considered the 
foundation of technical analysis, the Theory's principles were 
first laid out by the founder of the Wall Street Journal, 
Charles Henry Dow. Dow began by studying the industrial and 
railroad averages and publishing his observations. He did not 
intend for his theory to be used to predict market prices, 
rather he viewed it as an indicator of business conditions 
(Drew 26). The Industrials were considered a measure of the 
productive aspect of the market while the Rails were known as 
measuring distributive activity. Although the Rails are not 
the motivator of the nation today as they were previously, the 
Transportation Index is still reflective of market speculation 
and thus is a useful measure. These two averages are 
representative of the market as a whole since it has been 
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established that correlations exist among all the major 
averages. The Dow Theory has even been blamed for the 1929 
stock market crash by investor Gary Bosley. Bosley contends 
that the publication of the Dow's bear signal weeks before the 
crash was a contributing factor to the sell-off that occurred 
(Crim 72). 
The Dow Jones Industrial Average is known as the primary 
index since it generally is the first to signal a trend 
change. The Dow Jones Transportation Average is the 
confirming index. The Theory's basic assumption is that the 
movement of stock price averages represent "everything 
everybody knows, hopes, believes, and anticipates" (words of 
Charles Dow as cited in Drew 19) which is saying that the 
market is a summation of current business economics. The 
seven principles of the Dow Theory are: 
1. The two averages are a summation of all 
investors' activities. Everything that is 
known or expected and that could affect 
supply and demand of securities is 
reflected in the averages. 
2. The market displays three trends. A 
primary or long-term trend in stock prices 
which is from under a year to several 
years in length. A secondary trend that 
acts in the opposite direction of the 
primary trend and lasts three weeks to 
three months, and finally, a minor trend 
with a length of a few hours to two or 
three weeks that reflects day-to-day 
fluctuations that occur. The Dow Theory 
ignores the minor trend. 
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3. An upward primary trend has three up 
moves. The first reflects stock 
accumulation when savvy investors 
anticipate an improvement in prices. The 
second surge reflects buying based on 
improved company earnings. The third 
upward trend occurs when all the market 
news is positive and the general public 
begins to buy. 
4. A downward primary trend has three down 
moves. The first fall occurs when savvy 
investors realize that prices are too high 
and they begin to sell. The next downward 
move is when there are more sellers than 
buyers and investors begin to panic as 
they try to get out of the market. The 
final drop is a result of distress selling 
as buyers try to raise cash. 
5. Confirmations are exhibited when both 
averages reflect the same trend around the 
same time. A bear trend is confirmed when 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the 
Dow Jones Transportation Average hit a new 
low from a previous secondary reaction. 
The reverse signals a bull market (the 
averages hit a new high in an upward 
secondary reaction.) Without 
confirmation, it is less likely for a 
trend to continue. As a general rule, the 
sooner the confirmation occurs the 
stronger the move. 
6. Closing prices are used. 
7. A reversal of both averages must occur 
before a trend is broken. To correctly 
interpret the Dow Theory, one must 
distinguish between a new primary trend 
and the secondary movement of an existing 
trend. The price action defines the 
trend. 
(Colby and Meyers 179) 
These principles of the Theory are subject to 
erpretation. Martin Pring of "Pring Market Review" feels 
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that the application of the Theory is an art, "otherwise, a 
purely mechanical method would have become discounted in the 
market and personal judgment would be useless" (Crim 72). 
While the Theory outlines the market trends, it does not 
provide practical guidelines for forecasting the trend's 
duration or magnitude. Glickstein and Wubbels tested the Dow 
Theory by statistically establishing that a relationship 
exists between the confirmations and trend continuations. 
They found that there is a "strong, nonrandom connection 
between confirmations and continuation of trends in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average" (31). Their study supports the 
principle of confirmation. As for nonconfirmations, it is 
especially interesting to note that during their ten-year 
study period the "five major bottoms in the Industrials were 
signalled by non-confirmations in the Transports" (31). 
Another analyst notes that from 1920 to 1975 the Dow signals 
predicted sixty-eight percent of the moves for the Industrial 
and Transportation averages and sixty-seven percent of the 
Standard and Poors 500 Index (S&P). Even if positions had not 
been closed until confirmation, the Theory would have still 
predicted thirty-five percent of the Industrial and 
Transportation moves and twenty-nine percent of the S&P 500's 
moves (Crim 72). Pring, also notes that the averages have 
confirmed twenty-three sell signals since 1897 creating an 
average gain of thirty-five percent with only two creating 
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losses. Buy signals have occurred twenty-three times also but 
their return has only averaged ten and one-half percent with 
three possible losses (Crim 72). 
The Dow Theory has been criticized for giving late 
signals and thus missing the beginning and ending of major 
moves. While the Theory cannot provide enough of a lead 
signal to enable investors to get in or out at the top and 
bottom of the market, it does "keep the investor on the right 
side of most extended moves" even though the signal occurs 
twenty to twenty-five percent after a peak or low (Crim 72). 
Many technicians feel that the Dow Theory should only be used 
as a starting point. It will give the overall view of the 
market but may not be a practical method for trading. 
Filter Rules A simple method of market timing is 
filter rules. Filtering tests the assumption that new 
information is gradually incorporated into prices. Fama and 
Blume analyzed Sidney S. Alexander's filter method that used 
the rule "if the daily closing price of a particular security 
moves up at least x per cent, buy and hold the security until 
its price moves down at least x percent from a subsequent 
high, at which time simultaneously sell and go short" (227- 
228). This filter yielded substantial profits using various 
sizes of filters over different time periods. Before 
transaction costs, the filter performed better than a naive 
buy-and-hold strategy for fifteen of the thirty stocks. 
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Averaged over all the stocks, the filter produced eleven and 
one-half percent per year compared to ten point four percent 
for a buy-and-hold. However, when Fama and Blume considered 
transaction costs, the average rate of return to the filter 
became -103.59 percent per year. 
Aside from the transaction costs that drastically affect 
the returns generated by a filter rule, Alexander's 
methodology was questioned because he assumed that an investor 
could always buy and sell at the exact high and low and 
because of the bias resulting from the difficulties inherent 
in adjusting prices for the effect of dividends. Fama and 
Blume concluded that while Alexander's filter found some 
dependence in price changes, it was so small that the Random 
Walk Model was still sufficient to describe price behavior. 
Richard Sweeney (New 285) believes that the filter rule 
tests completed by Fama and Blume understated the returns 
relative to a buy-and-hold strategy. Sweeney asserts that 
averaging the filter results masks the success of the filter 
method on some stocks. Thus, rather than using all stocks in 
the database, he selected stocks from Fama and Blume's study 
that had been winners in one period and examined them using 
statistical confidence bounds. The composition of his trading 
list changed substantially each year but using past data to 
generate a new trading list for the year, statistically 
significant risk-adjusted profits were made in the following 
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year for the lower levels of transaction costs. Failure to 
update the list's composition resulted in lower returns as the 
years progressed. 
Assuming that closing prices were unbiased estimates of 
purchase and sale prices, Sweeney found that profits could be 
made if transaction costs were low, such as those available to 
a floor trader. He also considered only long equity 
positions, a contrast to Fama and Blume's criteria of 
employing short positions whenever the investor is not long in 
it. The avoidance of short positions increased returns since 
these positions usually performed poorly as well as created 
extra transaction costs. 
Sweeney (New 290) also feels that the transaction costs 
used in the Fama and Blume study were overstated. Since 1976, 
the clearing house fee has been three dollars per transaction, 
considerably less than the one-tenth of one percent on each 
complete transaction used by Fama and Blume. Therefore, for 
any transaction greater than six-thousand dollars, the one- 
twentieth of one percent for a one-way exchange was too large. 
It should be remembered that filter results are extremely 
sensitive to transaction costs and to the assumption that the 
closing price is an unbiased estimate of the purchase or 
selling price. Transaction costs are extremely important 
because the substantial number of buys and sells generated by 
a filter rule drastically reduce profits. In Sweeney's test, 
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on the average, each stock was bought or sold every three 
days, creating transaction costs of 0.1333% per day. 
The use of closing prices also caused differences in 
returns between Sweeney's and Fama and Blume's studies. The 
actual trigger price may occur earlier in the day; thus, by 
using closing prices in the studies, the results are somewhat 
skewed since the actual trade price may be above or below the 
trigger depending if it is a buy or sell. As noted by most 
studies, the only way to accurately test the strategies and 
alleviate the concerns is to put them into practice. 
Sweeney concluded that utilizing his methodology, fifteen 
of the thirty securities analyzed by Fama and Blume offered 
profits at the one-half of one percent filter rule from 1956 
to 1962. His subsequent testing for the 1970 to 1982 period 
with a statistical confidence bound, indicated significant 
profits for floor traders. Lower profits were available to 
money managers, while private transactors were unable to earn 
a profit. 
Sweeney attempted to answer the puzzle as to why 
substantial and significant risk-adjusted excess returns are 
possible in the face of the EMH, concluding either that: one, 
since the composition of the trading list varied year to year, 
winners are transitory and, therefore, the search must be 
continuous; or two, because the costs of developing the 
approach and experimenting to find the patterns in past prices 
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are extremely high and must be implemented by computer, 
insufficient numbers of investors are willing or able to 
utilize the system. 
CRISMA Pruitt and White (Pruitt and White, Crisma 55) 
developed a system of indicators to locate equities. Their 
multi-component strategy called "CRISMA" involves price, 
volume, and relative strength indicators on individual 
security issues. The acronym stands for the elements that are 
used: cumulative volume, relative strength, and moving 
average. They assert that the system is being used actively 
and has outperformed the market even when two percent 
transaction costs are considered. 
CRISMA uses filter graphs to measure upward price 
momentum. The filters, "based upon a stock's relative 
strength compared to the S&P 500, cumulative volume, and 50- 
day and 200-day moving averages of prices, attempt to measure 
and 'triple confirm' upward momentum" (Pruitt and White, 
Crisma 55). A fourth "penetration filter" is required before 
an actual buy recommendation is made. 
Three criteria are required to place a stock in a buy 
position. The first, meaning price is trending up, is "the 
50-day price moving average graph must intersect the 200-day 
price moving average graph from below when the slope of the 
latter graph is greater than or equal to zero" (Pruitt and 
White, Crisma 56). 
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"Second, the relative strength graph, from beginning to 
ending point over the previous four weeks, must have a slope 
greater than or equal to zero" (Pruitt and White, Crisma 56). 
The purpose of this filter is to ensure that the stock's 
recent price performance has been similar to the market as a 
whole. 
"Finally, the cumulative volume graph from beginning to 
ending point over the previous four weeks must have a slope 
greater than zero" (Crisma 56). This filter confirms that 
trading volume increases are consistent with rising stock 
prices. 
The final "penetration filter" is constructed to help 
avoid false signals that generate whipsaws. Once the first 
three criteria have been met, the security is purchased when 
the "price reaches 110% of the level established by the 
intersection of the 50- and 200-day moving average graphs" 
(Pruitt and White, Crisma 56). Sells are signalled either 
when "prices fall below the 200-day price moving average graph 
or rise above 120% of the level established by the 
intersection of the 50-day and 200-day price moving average 
graphs" (Pruitt and White, Crisma 56). 
Pruitt and White contend that this system can be utilized 
in a minimum of time. The stocks are easily identified by 
looking at weekly stock graphs to find the three confirmation 
filters. After the initial identification, one must note the 
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date of the confirmation, determine the 110% and 120% price 
levels, and then follow the stock to catch the buy and sell 
signals. 
Elliott Wave The Elliott Wave Principle, created by 
Ralph Nelson Elliott, has many proponents and a similar number 
of opponents. His followers, in particular Robert Prechter, 
avow that this tool is invaluable in market forecasting. The 
basic theory is that the stock market trend develops in a 
pattern of eight waves (five waves up and three waves down) of 
varying lengths, some as short as a single trade and others 
that last centuries. The three down waves are "corrections" 
of the previous five up waves. The first eight-wave cycle is 
followed by a comparable eight-wave cycle which is then 
followed by a final five-wave up pattern. This major upward 
movement is succeeded by a major three-wave down movement that 
corrects the five major upward waves (Frost and Prechter 20). 
By classifying and counting the waves, market trends are 
determined. Bull and bear markets are distinguished because 
certain wave combinations are not possible during these 
trends. The establishment of the various wave combinations is 
often confusing and the rules of the Elliott Wave Theory are 
complex (Gehm 51). Elliott's theory stresses the Fibonacci 
number series in which each number is the sum of the previous 
two numbers (1,1,2,3,5,8, etc.). At any one time, the market 
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may be on a short-term downward wave of only an hour in 
duration and also on an upward wave that lasts centuries. 
Moving Averages One of the simplest trend indicators 
is a moving average of prices that displays the consensus of 
the market by eliminating the inconsistent points. This 
smoothed average, which works best in trending markets, serves 
as a point of reference for determining the market tendency. 
With the arrival of computers, simple moving averages have 
given way to exponential moving averages that smooth out old 
data and give more weight to the most recent prices during a 
specified period. Buy and sell signals are generated when 
the price crosses over one of its moving averages. The 
general rule is to buy when prices rise up through the moving 
average line and to sell when prices drop below the line. The 
critical decision is to determine when the crossover is truly 
a trend change and not just a minor adjustment. Some 
technical systems, such as William O'Neill's "CANSLIM", also 
use volume as a key to trend changes, however, when strictly 
utilizing moving averages, price is the only issue, volume is 
not considered. 
Some technicians lag the moving average by a few days to 
make crossovers more discernible or to at least confirm a 
trend change. The 200-day simple moving average has been used 
for years and is easy to calculate: add the closing prices 
for the past two-hundred trading days and divide by two- 
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hundred (some use the weekly closing prices for the past forty 
weeks and then divide by forty) (Colby and Meyers 452). 
Technicians use various lengths for the moving averages; Elder 
(Moving 32) says to use the length of the market cycle to 
determine the moving average length. For traders, the best 
moving average is "half the length of the market's dominant 
cycle." He continues with some guidelines for trading with 
moving averages: 
Buy and hold when prices and the moving 
average are headed up. 
Sell when the moving average stops rising 
and goes flat. 
Go short when prices penetrate below the 
moving average and the moving average 
turns down. 
Cover shorts at the first sign the moving 
average is flattening. Tops tend to 
develop over a longer period of time, 
giving you time to sell. Bottoms tend to 
form much faster, and you have to cover 
your shorts quickly to preserve profits. 
Some technicians develop an envelope from the moving 
average in an attempt to filter out minor irregularities. 
There are a variety of methods to generate the envelope, one 
of the simplest is to use the price close, high, and low to 
create a three-point moving average. Another technique is to 
create the band by widening the moving average on both sides 
by a percentage. A price must cross the entire envelope to 
generate a signal. While this method does screen out minor 
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aberrations, it is also possible that if the band is too wide 
true trend moves will be ignored (Stein, Traders 27) 
Moving Average Convergence/Divergency (MACD) An 
increasingly favored price-based momentum oscillator developed 
by George Appel, the MACD is based on exponential moving 
averages (EMA) that evaluate bullish and bearish trends. MACD 
is superior to a simple moving average (SMA) because it 
utilizes three exponential moving averages and it is their 
crossovers, not price, that generate trading signals. The 
MACD attempts to anticipate a crossover since it "reacts when 
the averages begin to converge (or diverge)" (Seykota 36), 
resulting in a quicker signal than is generated by an SMA. 
The MACD line, also called the fast line, is the 
difference between a twenty-six week EMA and a twelve-week EMA 
of closing prices. The third EMA is a nine-week EMA of the 
MACD line and is called the signal or slow line (while weeks 
are commonly used, the period can also be a day or a month). 
When the MACD line crosses above the signal line a buy is 
indicated and when it drops below, it gives a sell signal 
(Aspray 44). 
Actions that are indicated at the crossovers of the MACD 
and signal line are similar to those at the crossing of two 
simple moving averages with long positions flagged on upward 
crossovers and short positions on downward crossovers. The 
crossover usually confirms a peak or trough with divergences 
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between the crossover and price being especially strong 
signals. The most important crossovers, according to Elder 
(How to 70), are those occurring furthest from the MACD zero 
line because these result in the investors rushing with the 
emotion of the trend. When crossovers occur near the zero 
line, nonproductive moves usually occur since "public emotion 
is flat, disinterested" (How to 70). Elder also believes that 
MACD works when markets are moving but produce losses when 
markets go flat (Moving 36). Stein (Traders' 27) cautions 
that crossovers in overbought/oversold zones should be 
utilized in trading markets while valid crossovers can occur 
in other areas for trending markets. 
Use of an MACD histogram can improve the speed and 
effectiveness of this indicator. Trading signals are 
generated from direction changes in the histogram, sells are 
flagged when the "histogram tries to rally and then falls, and 
you buy the upturns" (Elder, How to 68). Elder continues that 
while the MACD lines signify direction, the MACD histogram 
tracks momentum by its height which measures the distance 
between the MACD line and the signal line. As the histogram 
ascends, bullish forces are building and the growing size 
indicates a healthy uptrend (Elder, Using MACD 36). When the 
histogram deflates the trend is losing steam and a reversal is 
possible (Elder, How to 70). If the MACD line is above the 
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signal line, the histogram is directed upward and the obverse 
is true for a downward directed histogram. 
"Another powerful signal is given when MACD lines and 
prices keep moving in the same direction, but the MACD 
histogram flattens out and diverges from their patterns" 
(Elder, How to 70). If the MACD histogram shortens while 
prices expand, the bullish trend is weakening. Elder explains 
that buys are signalled when "price makes a second bottom, 
equal to or deeper than the first, but the second bottom of 
MACD-histogram is higher" with the true signal being the 
indicator's uptick from its second bottom, the reverse 
procedure can be used to find the tops (Heeding 36). He 
believes that this type of divergence is rare and happens only 
at major trend changes (How to 70). 
A summary of Elder's trading rules (Using MACD 36): 
1. Buy when MACD-histogram declines below its 
centerline and its slope turns up. Place a stop-loss 
order below the low of the price bar corresponding 
to the lowest bar of MACD-histogram. 
2. Sell when MACD-histogram rallies above its 
centerline and then its slope turns down. Place a 
stop-loss order above the high of the price bar that 
corresponds to the highest bar of MACD-histogram. 
Remember that tops normally take more time to form 
than bottoms. Buy fast and sell short slowly. 
3. The best buy signals are given by bullish 
divergences between MACD-histogram and price. When 
prices decline to a lower or equal low but MACD- 
histogram holds above its previous low, buy as soon 
as the indicator ticks higher. Place a stop below 
the price low corresponding to the latest bottom in 
MACD-histogram. 
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4. The best signals to sell short are given by bearish 
divergences between MACD-histogram and price. When 
prices rise to a new high but MACD-histogram makes a 
lower top, sell as soon as the indicator ticks 
lower. Place a stop above the high associated with 
the tallest bar of MACD-histogram at the second 
top. " 
Not everyone is as enthusiastic about MACD as Stein and 
Elder. Seykota (36) cites several studies that have indicated 
that MACD is less than accurate and timely. According to The 
Encyclopedia of Technical Market Indicators (281), MACD 
"substantially underperforms a 40-week simple moving average 
crossover rule." The Dow Jones Irwin Guide to Trading 
Systems. says Seykota, finds that MACD displayed inferior 
results to other moving average methods and combinations and 
other tests confirm these findings. The fact that MACD 
anticipates is counterproductive since the "whole advantage of 
using moving averages is that they are slow and give signals 
when a market's trend is well under way." Traders who rely on 
the trend believe "the best time to trade is well into the 
trend, with momentum" (Seykota 36). The anticipation may pick 
a top, but is more likely to pick up on false signals and 
create a whipsaw. 
Seykota concludes that for long-term trading, MACD under¬ 
performs other systems and that MACD's short-term trading 
results are poor. Advocates of MACD counter these accusations 
by saying that MACD is not a signal but rather it is an 
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indicator that should only be used in conjunction with other 
indicators. 
Relative Strength Index One of the most popular 
technical tools, the Relative Strength Index (RSI), was 
developed by technician J. Welles Wilder in 1976. It is 
frequently referred to as Wilder's Relative Strength to 
distinguish it from another technical tool known as the 
Relative Strength Indicator. The RSI is an oscillator that 
measures the market's strength and weakness depending on where 
prices close during a specified period of time. The 
assumption is that the market is stronger when the closing 
prices are higher and for a weaker market the closes are 
lower. 
The formula for RSI is 100 - (100/1 + (average number of 
up closes/average number of down closes). The result is often 
smoothed using a moving average before being graphed on a 
scale of zero to one hundred (Stein, Divergence 32). More 
erratic movements and false signals are generated as the time 
period is shortened; longer time periods produce an RSI that 
gives fewer but more reliable signals (Colby and Meyers 433). 
Wilder suggests using a fourteen-day time period because it 
generates more precise signals (Elder, RSI 38). 
Because RSI depends on ratios, it "is subject to greater 
volatility, distortions, and erratic movements than smoothed 
indicators that are not dependent on ratios. This results in 
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a higher number of signals (and thus higher transaction costs) 
compared with smoothed momentum indicators that are not 
dependent on ratios" (Colby and Meyers 433). 
The major application for RSI is as an overbought - 
oversold indicator. Welles suggests that an RSI over seventy 
is indicative of an overbought market and that an RSI reading 
below thirty means the market is oversold (Aan 76). Babcock 
(56) says Wilder also believed that if the RSI line crossed 
above or below the fifty mark that it was pointing to a trend 
change. Some traders have found that during long-term 
downtrends the index usually remains below sixty while during 
rallies it stays above forty (Stein, Traders 28). Elder 
(Explaining 36) cautions that oscillators will often produce 
premature signals when a market trend begins. 
RSI is actually a way to quantify price momentum or 
velocity. A chart of the RSI resembles a price chart and some 
investors utilize trendlines and moving averages to decipher 
the pattern. A broken RSI trendline very often corresponds to 
a broken price trendline (Stein, Twists 24). Elder (RSI 38) 
says the RSI often "breaks its trendline one bar earlier than 
price." 
When RSI enters the overbought-oversold zones, traders 
believe a top or bottom price is near. RSI's overbought- 
oversold zones are seventy and above and thirty and below, 
respectively. Sells should be initiated after the RSI has 
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been above seventy and then drops back down below it while 
buys are flagged when the RSI rises above thirty after being 
below (Stein, Twists 24). According to Elder (RSI 38), there 
is a danger that the RSI can remain overbought for a 
considerable length of time during a strong rally and oversold 
during extended declines. This could result in premature buys 
and sells that could denigrate returns. 
Andrew Cardwell uses a revised overbought-oversold range. 
He prefers different ranges for uptrends and for downtrends. 
Uptrends appear to explore the eighty-forty range while 
downtrends vary between sixty and twenty. Other technicians 
agree that uptrends usually have higher RSI tops and bottoms 
while downtrends show lower tops and bottoms. When RSI stays 
between eighty and forty or sixty and twenty, it is telling 
you the trend. Even though Cardwell favors the revised 
ranges, he still believes that most long-term divergences 
occur at the seventy-thirty level (Stein, Twists 25). 
Cardwell also defined the positive and negative reversal 
patterns in the Relative Strength Index. According to him, a 
positive reversal occurs when prices top, retreat, rise to a 
higher top and then again retreat, but to a higher low. The 
Relative Strength Index traces a similar pattern to the price, 
however, the second retreat drops to a lower low. The 
positive reversal pattern is indicative of a market that is 
preparing to rise to new highs. As Cardwell explains, the 
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lower RSI creates a "spring effect likely to push the market 
even higher, like an athlete who jumps from a crouch" (Elder, 
RSI 38). The new projected high is equal to the distance from 
the first price low to the second, higher, top plus the 
distance from the second top to the second bottom. 
A negative reversal is marked by a price peak that is 
lower than the previous peak while the RSI's second peak is 
higher than the first peak. This pattern is often interpreted 
as reflecting a bullish market. In other words, the market is 
more overbought at a lower price level. The positive and 
negative reversals are frequently used with bullish and 
bearish divergences to help interpret the market trend. 
One of the most valuable trading signals, according to 
Elder (RSI 38), is divergence. A divergence is the opposite 
of a confirmation where RSI and price replicate each other's 
pattern. While divergences rarely occur, it provides an 
opportunity for substantial gains at reduced risk. Bullish 
divergence results when prices are at a low, rally, and then 
fall even lower. At the same time the RSI pattern is similar 
only the second low is higher than the first indicating that 
bullish strength is forming even though prices are weak. 
Thus, prices should strengthen in the near future. 
A bearish divergence pattern is when prices rise, fall, 
and then rise even higher while the second RSI top is lower. 
This format shows that the market is losing momentum despite 
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the stronger price (Elder, RSI 38). This pattern is a sell 
signal since it is often an advance signal that a top may be 
forming (Aan 76). 
By plotting RSI beneath a daily price chart, it is 
relatively easy to spot divergences. It displays many of the 
same formations as prices such as peaks and troughs and 
trendlines. Stein (Divergences 33) uses the rule that a 
signal is stronger the more time that elapses between peaks or 
between lows and the "long-term, larger-scale divergences on 
the weekly charts" are a more important indicator. Other 
technicians only consider the divergences that occur in the 
RSI's buy or sell zone (Stein, Twists 24). 
Relative Strength Indicator Unrelated to the Relative 
Strength Index, the Relative Strength Indicator is "simply the 
ratio of one data series divided by another" (Colby and Meyers 
431) and is used to describe the stock's performance relative 
to the overall market. To calculate the indicator for an 
individual stock, the stock's price is divided by a more 
general market index (such as the Standard & Poor's 500 
Index). The resulting ratio can then be plotted on a line 
chart where trendline analysis, moving averages, and other 
analytical techniques can be employed. 
Strong relative strength trends within a industry group 
often endure for years. When major trend changes begin to 
occur, the relative strength gradually loses momentum with the 
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actual trend change taking several months to evolve. Alan 
Shaw of Smith Barney, analyzes weekly and monthly relative 
strength ratios with raw price data, watching for "tandem 
confirmation (suggesting the continuation of an existing 
trend) or divergence (suggesting a significant trend change)" 
(Colby and Meyers 431). 
Momentum An overbought/oversold indicator, Momentum 
measures the rate that prices are rising or falling. The 
indicator is computed by "adding or subtracting price 
differentials from one period to the next" (Stein, Traders' 
28). An overbought/oversold condition is marked when the 
indicator, plotted as a histogram, crosses the zero line. The 
universal practice is to buy when the indicator passes up 
through the line, and to sell when it passes down through it. 
When the crossovers follow divergences, the signal is even 
more accurate. 
As with moving averages, the time length is very 
important with momentum. Many experts counsel using a time 
length that matches the cycle of the market under analysis. 
Caution is suggested, however, when trying to use the 
indicator during strong, long-term trends because of the 
possibility of false signals (Stein, Traders' 28). 
Stochastics George Lane is recognized as developing 
stochastics, a momentum or price velocity indicator that 
signals trends and overbought/oversold conditions. Some 
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technicians believe that stochastic signals reversals at least 
one to two weeks before MACD (Elder, Using Stochastics 72). 
The concept is to detect crossovers for trends but only those 
in overbought/oversold regions. Closing prices are recorded 
and tracked to discover if the trend is bullish or bearish. 
The idea is that during rallies, the daily prices will close 
near their top, however, if the closing tick begins to fall 
while prices continue to rise, the trend is thought to be 
growing weaker and a trend reversal is possible (Elder, Three 
36), The obverse is true for downtrends, while closing prices 
are near the bottom of the range, the trend will continue 
down, however, when closing prices graduate higher within the 
range, strength is building for a trend reversal. 
Stochastics represent the daily closing price as a 
percentage of the closing prices for a predetermined time 
range, normally five to eighteen days. This percentage is 
then smoothed by several moving averages. Two numbers are 
generated, %K also called raw stochastic and %D which is 
called smoothed stochastic and is actually a smoothed moving 
average of %K. Some technicians calculate an even "slower" 
version of %D by subjecting it to another layer of averaging. 
This slower version decreases whipsaws and is better fitted 
for use with longer-term tactics and for more conservative 
traders (Elder, Using Stochastics 68). 
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The stochastic %D is plotted on a chart and oscillates 
between zero and one-hundred. Zero indicates that today's 
close is equal to the lowest price in the period tested and 
one-hundred signifies that the close is equal to the highest 
price in the period. Signals are generated as it crosses 
above seventy-five (over-bought) and below twenty-five (over¬ 
sold) (Stein, What Divergence 33). 
Elder (Three 36 and Using Stochastic 70) and Stein 
(Traders' 29 and Learning 36) provide guidelines on how to 
utilize the stochastic signals: 
1. The stochastics line direction displays 
the immediate trend. Bearish trends are 
displayed when %K crosses below %D and 
bullish when it crosses above %D. A new 
trend is being established when %K is 
initially above 75 and then crosses down 
below 75 or when %K crosses above 25 when 
initially below 25. Elder believes that 
double bottoms and double tops provide 
particularly strong signals and even more 
especially when divergence occurs. George 
Lane adheres to the concept that the 
trends involve three rallies or three 
declines. 
2. Overbought/oversold analysis uses %D, its 
readings are reliable for identifying 
short-term tops and bottoms when a market 
is in a trading range. When the market 
begins trending, this method should not be 
relied upon. 
3. Divergence between the indicator and the 
price provide lucrative signals with %D 
tending to be more effective than %K. A 
bearish divergence happens when prices 
rise, pause, then rise to new highs but 
the indicator rises, pauses, then rises to 
a lower high. For a bullish divergence, 
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prices drop, pause, and then drop lower 
while the indicator falls, pauses, and 
falls to a higher low. 
Stochastics must be interpreted, it is not simply a 
mechanical tool that replaces judgement since crossovers may 
occur when trends are not changing or divergence may give 
false signals. Stein (Learning 36) cautions that one must 
learn how to utilize stochastics to screen out false signals. 
One warning that Stein issues is to ignore bullish divergence 
between the overbought and oversold zones unless it occurs in 
a powerful bull market. Another caution is that while 
stochastics is a powerful tool on daily and hourly charts, it 
should be viewed with caution on weekly charts (Stein, 
Traders' 29). 
The Encyclopedia of Technical Indicators (Colby and 
Meyers 473) advises that stochastics "can jump around 
erratically due solely to data for the oldest period being 
dropped off" creating an inherent weakness for unstable, false 
signals. It also believes that the best indications for buys 
are in the ten to fifteen percent range while sells are more 
reliable when occurring in the eighty-five to ninety percent 
zones. 
Directional Movement One technical indicator that is 
time-consuming to calculate is Directional Movement Index 
(DMI). This trend flag is actually three distinct pointers: 
a +DI (upward movement, i.e., percent that today's high is 
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above yesterday's high), -DI (downward movement, i.e., percent 
today's low is below yesterday's low), and ADX (average 
directional index, i.e, the +DI and -DI netted to a single 
plus or minus figure). The daily direction is calculated by 
averaging the true daily ranges and dividing this figure into 
an exponential moving average of the up directional movements; 
the same procedure is performed on the down directional 
figures. Both of these lines are plotted on a graph to show 
the trend (Stein, Traders' 30 and Babcock 56). 
The +DI attempts to assess the force of upward pressure, 
-DI the force of downward pressure and ADX the tendency for 
trending in general. However, DMI is virtually useless in 
trendless markets. The entire DMI philosophy is based on 
comparing today's range to yesterday's range. While the ADX 
by itself is a gauge of bullish or bearish trends, the 
correlation of the ADX to the other two indexes is also 
meaningful (Stein, Traders' 30). 
Crossovers between -DI and +DI inaugurate trades: "Buy 
when +DI rises above -DI, sell from the converse" (Stein, 
Traders' 30). The more elevated the ADX, the more powerful 
the trend. If the ADX peaks and begins to drop, the market 
anticipates an important trend change. For assistance in 
reducing a position, on long positions, Stein (Trader's 30) 
instructs to "wait for +DI to break below the ADX line and 
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then ADX itself turns down. The same goes for a short 
position but use -DI." 
Price and Volume Many technicians believe that the 
"absolute value of price change is positively and linearly 
related to volume" (Rogalski 268), with volume being measured 
as the number of shares being bought and/or sold in a given 
time period. The theory maintains that with a stock at 
equilibrium, an increase or decrease in demand (volume) will 
create a price above or below equilibrium. Transactions only 
occur as a result of demand, thus a rise or fall in volume 
(demand) will cause prices to rise or fall. Rogalski (268) 
credits Copeland with testing the direction of the 
demand/price correlation. Copeland, using volume as 
representative of information dispersal to the market, 
concluded that there is a positive and linear relationship if 
sequential information is legitimate. An inverse correlation 
would occur if the hypothesis of simultaneous information 
arrival was valid. 
Rogalski's study suggests that awareness of volume 
behavior may enhance price projections. He warns, however, 
that causality is not determined by his methodology. Thus, 
volume may cause price, price may cause volume, or there may 
be price-volume feedback. Nonetheless, all instances are 
suggestive of price-volume dependence. Bohan (36) also 
theorizes that price and volume analysis may detect trading 
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pattern changes and assist in creating an above average 
return. Epps (586) is another who contends that the volume of 
shares traded is higher in bull markets and lower in bear 
markets. 
The results of Charles Ying's (Epps 586) testing of price 
and volume found that sizable volume increases are usually- 
attended by large price modifications while meager volumes 
generally accompany lower prices. This study has been 
questioned, however, because the effects of dividends and new 
issues have not be confronted. 
Discretion should be used since volume is subject to 
forces such as seasonal patterns, holidays, arbitrage, etc., 
that may misrepresent true demand and supply. Another area 
for caution is when volume is trending up, rather than 
confirming a trend, it may be a crowd reaction at a pivot 
point (Colby and Meyers 515). Colby and Meyers continue that 
volume is a "erratic, unreliable barometer of the market . . . 
indicators weighted significantly by volume appear to suffer 
from the instability of the volume data itself." 
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CHAPTER III 
TESTING OF THREE INDICATORS 
The only true test of technical indicators is to actually 
perform buys and sells based on the indicators being utilized. 
This method assures that buy and sell prices, times, and 
transaction costs are accurate. Indirect testing makes it 
virtually impossible to precisely portray reality. However, 
it must be realized that empirical tests are subject to biases 
since each indicator requires analysis and interpretation, 
resulting in the possibility that one-hundred technicians 
could come up with the same number of readings based on a 
specific indicator, creating different buy and sell trigger 
points and, thus, impacting return considerably. Each 
indicator can also be based on different criteria; the 
decision to use simple or exponential moving averages or 
adjusting the length of the time span used to calculate the 
indicator will result in different buy and sell positions. 
Study Design 
This study is designed to see if the average investor can 
use moving averages, MACD, and Wilder's Relative Strength to 
determine effective buy and sell signals that create better 
returns than a simple buy-and-hold strategy. Ten stocks were 
chosen at random, the critera being that they were well-known 
and that the data base from which the information was garnered 
held sufficient data on which to test the indicators. The 
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"Telescan System" was utilized to locate the stock data and 
for computing the indicators and plotting the graphs. The 
earliest Telescan data available for the stocks chosen was 
October 3, 1988, and an ending date of March 17, 1993 was 
used. In an effort to keep the testing simple, the indicators 
were not combined in any manner, rather each indicator was 
viewed in a vacuum as it related to the individual stock. 
Simplistic interpretation methods, as outlined below for each 
indicator, were utilized in reading the indicators; while this 
may impact the returns generated, it was a trade-off against 
the possibility of creating interpretation biases produced by 
a specific individual's reading of the indicator. 
Moving Average 
In selecting a moving average, it was decided to test the 
difference between a twenty-five day and a nine-day 
exponential moving average. This choice was based on 
suggestions in the "Telescan System" information as being a 
starting point for moving average analysis. Both moving 
averages were plotted on a single graph with the difference 
displayed at the bottom of the graph. The difference is 
plotted around a zero line. The zero line indicates the point 
where the two moving averages cross which is defined as the 
buy or sell position. When the difference line crosses the 
zero line upward, a buy signal is indicated. When the 
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difference line crosses the zero line downward, a sell signal 
is given (see Figure 1). 
MACD 
Two MACDs were utilized for this test, one for the buy 
signal (8-17-9) and a different length for the sell signal 
(12-25-9.) For the buy, an eight-day fast moving average, a 
seventeen-day slow moving average, and a nine-day exponential 
moving average of their difference for the signal line was 
selected. The sell MACD employed a twelve-day fast MA, a 
twenty-five day slow MA, and a nine-day difference for the 
signal line. The MA lengths for both the buy and sell signals 
were the recommendations of MACD's creator, George Appel. The 
MACD was plotted as a histogram, which makes reading the 
indicator easier. A buy signal is given when the MACD 
histogram moves above the zero line from negative to positive. 
A sell signal occurs when the histogram moves across the zero 
line from positive to negative. (See Figure 2.) 
Wilder's Relative Strength 
The final indicator tested was Wilder's Relative Strength 
Index. Seventy percent was used as the overbought point and 
thirty percent was the oversold condition. When the RSI 
crossed the seventy percent line going downward, a sell signal 
was generated. When the RSI crossed the thirty percent line 
going upwards, a buy was indicated. (See Figure 3.) 
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(Appendix A contains detailed information for the stocks 
in the study). Using the "Telescan System", price and volume 
information was plotted for each of the ten stocks for the 
period October 3, 1988, through March 17, 1993. Using this 
information as a base, each of the three indicators was 
calculated and plotted by Telescan and the resulting buy and 
sell prices and dates, as determined utilizing the criteria 
outlined for each indicator, were logged in a spreadsheet. 
The profit or loss for each buy and sell was calculated as 
well as the number of days during which the stock was not 
being held. For the time periods when the funds were not 
invested in the stocks, income was calculated as if it were 
invested at a rate equal to the average prime rate for the 
October 3, 1988, through March 17, 1993, time span. 
An arbitrary decision was made to purchase one-hundred 
shares of stock at each buy signal. If the indicator was not 
in a buy position on October 3, 1988, the funds were 
considered invested at the average prime rate. If the 
indicator was in a buy position, one-hundred shares were 
considered purchased on that date. At the end of the time 
period, (March 17, 1993), if the stocks were currently held, 
they were deemed sold and the profit or loss was calculated; 
if the stocks were not held at the ending date, then the 
investment at the average prime rate was considered terminated 
62 
and the resulting income was recorded. Dividends were 
included as part of the return if the stocks were held on the 
ex-dividend date. The transaction costs were calculated at 
twenty-nine dollars per each buy and sell, this is the rate 
available to the average investor using a discount broker. 
The returns from using the indicators were compared to a buy- 
and-hold strategy and also to the results if the funds had 
been invested for the entire time period at the average prime 
rate. A summary of the results for each strategy is in 
Appendix B. 
In only one instance did the indicators provide a better 
return than a simple buy-and-hold or investing at the average 
prime rate. For Edison Brothers, using the difference between 
a twenty-five day and nine-day moving average as the trigger, 
a return of $4,548 was generated (see Table 1). This was 
$1,272 greater than that provided by a buy-and-hold strategy. 
In only two cases (Boeing and Loews) did the investment at the 
average prime rate provide a greater return than the buy-and- 
hold. 
The average income per each buy and sell trigger for each 
indicator is displayed in Tables one, two and three. The 
highest average ($454.76) was for Edison Brothers, based on 
the moving average indicator. The lowest average (<$139.16>) 
was also for Edison Brothers, utilizing Wilder's Relative 
Strength. Over all stocks, the moving average generated a 
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$1,210 average income with a standard deviation of 2035.7998. 
Wilder's Relative Strength produced an average income of $888 
with a 1354.8328 standard deviation, and, finally, MACD 
provided a $182 average income with a 1451.1796 standard 
deviation. 
Table 1 Statistics for moving average indicator with a 




Without With Dividends & Tran Costs 
Div Sc Costs Buy/Sell Standard 





Avon 28 $4,027 $3,928 $262 479.6186 $4,791 $1,179 
Boeing 42 ( 348) ( 1,270 ( 58) 434.4578 1,003 1,354 
Bristol 41 1,113 608 29 329.6135 2,179 2,127 
Colgate 28 3,250 2,750 183 354.107 4,766 1,076 
Edison 18 4,673 4,547 455 721.6747 3,276 707 
Hershey 44 564 ( 479) ( 21) 345.8637 3,204 1,209 
Loews 37 1,361 523 28 945.9422 2,980 3,819 
P. Morris 35 4,219 2,778 154 691.3597 4,764 1,172 
P. Petroleum 44 ( 498) ( 1,474) ( 64) 111.242 1,102 882 
Serv. Master 36 $ 911 182 10 194.6633 1,807 780 
All stocks: Average Income=$l, 210 Standard Deviation=2035. 7998 rr n H 00 00 
Table 2. Statistics for Wilder 
with a comparison to 
's relative strength indicator 
buy-and-hold 
Indicator Indicator 
Without With Dividends & Tran Costs 
No. Div Sc Costs Buy/Sell Standard Buy Sc Invest 
Sigs . Income Income Avg Inc. Deviation Hold Avg Prime 
Avon 24 $3,361 $3,156 $263 543.3538 $4,791 $1,179 
Boeing 16 275 24 3 543.6745 1,003 1,354 
Bristol 19 637 557 70 561.3366 2,179 2,127 
Colgate 17 2,387 2,179 272 196.3547 4,766 1,076 
Edison 20 ( 1,051) ( 1,391) ( 139) 850.9634 3,276 707 
Hershey 17 1,301 935 104 203.7656 3,204 1,209 
Loews 26 ( 386) ( 934) ( 67) 600.9984 2,980 3,819 
P. Morris 17 2,363 2,354 262 694.3437 4,764 1,172 
P. Petroleum 14 1,112 1,002 143 236.8237 1,102 882 
Serv. Master 15 1,099 1,003 125 104.9796 1,807 780 
All stocks: Avg Income=$ 888 Standard Deviation=1354. 8328 t = 2.07 
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Table 3. Statistics for Moving Average Convergence/Divergence 
(MACD) indicator with a comparison to buy-and-hold 
Indicator Indicator 
Without With Dividends & Tran Costs 
No. Div & Costs Buy/Sell Standard Buy & Invest 
Sigs. Income Income Avg Inc. Deviation Hold Avg Prime 
Avon 32 $2 ,687 $2,410 $142 728 , .2565 $4,791 $1. , 179 
Boeing 42 ( 398) (1,379) ( 63) 295 , . 162 1,003 1, , 354 
Bristol 35 525 258 144 10 . . 9461 2,179 2 , , 127 
Colgate 34 2,488 1,826 101 332 . . 3376 4,766 1, , 076 
Edison 27 1,623 1,239 88 721. . 6651 3,276 707 
Hershey 48 850 ( 312) ( 12) 208 . . 7644 3,204 1, ,209 
Loews 38 ( 488) (1,334) 67 1024 . . 631 2,980 3, , 819 
P. Morris 39 2,479 753 38 633 . . 1057 4,764 1, . 172 
P. Petroleum 56 1,075 (2,398) ( 83) 121 . . 5523 1,102 882 
Serv. Master 42 1,713 746 34 266 . , 6917 1,807 780 
All stocks: Avg Income=$ 182 Standard Deviation=1451.1796 t=.40 
Of the ten stocks chosen for the study, seven were very 
large corporations (Boeing, Bristol-Myers, Colgate, Hershey, 
Loews, Phillip Morris, and Phillips Petroleum). The remaining 
three were smaller, less diversified companies (Avon, Edison 
Brothers, and ServiceMaster). Of these three, Edison Brothers 
is the least known and more likely to be a "trading" stock 
(i.e., less likely to provide a consistent return over time). 
I believe this is the reason the moving average indicator was 
able to generate a greater return than using a buy-and-hold 
strategy. 
Thus, for this study, the technical indicators were 
unable to generate a consistent improvement to returns from a 
buy-and-hold approach. Whether this would have been the case 
if the stocks chosen for testing had been less widely held and 
65 
known companies should be examined. Perhaps utilizing an 
approach similar to Sweeney's (New), wherein the list of 
stocks to trade should be revised periodically based on the 





There are conflicting views on whether technical analysis 
is a valid system for tracing the market and individual 
stocks. The opposing sides are vehement in the defense of 
their convictions. 
Seykota believes that using technical indicators requires 
an emotional aptitude. Many traders do not want to deal with 
their emotions and abandon their systems instead of following 
the rules. He continues that indicators "do not predict--they 
either just diet (say what's happening) or postdict (say 
what's happened)" (37). I disagree with his position that it 
is the lack of emotion that leads them to forego their 
systems, rather it is the surplus of emotion that causes them 
to abandon systems and to rely on their gut instinct. 
Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1733) raise the concern 
of data snooping that may possibly cause the location of 
"patterns" to emerge. Individuals who are intensely 
scrutinizing information, such as stock prices and volumes, 
are more likely to find patterns, even if they are spurious. 
They continue with support from cognitive psychology that 
theorizes that an individual's natural inclination is to focus 
on the unusual. These proclivities lead to the potentiality 
for selection bias and significance enhancement on what may 
otherwise be unrelated information. Epps (590) also 
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reinforces this point by his observation that people more 
readily accept information that supports their currently held 
views. 
Recently, there has been more support for technical 
analysis. The Random Walk, so efficiently supported by Fama, 
has been challenged from several angles. Fama (Efficient 415- 
416) felt that the strong form efficient market "for the 
purposes of most investors. . .seems a good first (and second) 
approximation to reality" since the only groups who have 
monopolistic access to information is corporate insiders and 
specialists. While insider information may not permeate down 
the market very far, it does make the market inefficient. 
Non-random price patterns have been one clue to the 
inefficiency. The price patterns are consistent with the two- 
hundred year trend in earnings and dividends. Colby and 
Meyers (413) do not believe this anomaly can be explained 
away, and concede that it appears that some technical methods 
may provide excess profits, at least at times. 
Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron also found irregularities 
in the Random Walk and cited several studies that found 
indications that past returns are helpful in predicting future 
returns. They offer two opposing explanations: "(1) market 
inefficiency in which prices take swings from their 
fundamental values, and (2) markets are efficient and the 
predictable variation can be explained by time-varying 
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equilibrium returns" (1732) . However, they have provided no 
evidence to support either conclusion. 
Pruitt and White (Crisma), Epps, and Rogalski similarly 
have found positive correlation between price changes and 
volume changes; Bohan and Brush (Eight) found that relative 
strength indicators may assist in providing price predictions. 
Even though providing support, some researchers caution 
investors on utilizing technical analysis without thinking. 
Some traders get carried away using indicators and lose sight 
of the markets. They forget most indicators deal with only a 
few numbers: open, high, low, and closing prices plus volume. 
These numbers can only be explored in a limited number of 
ways. Technicians who attempt to combine several indicators 
may only get an illusion of thoroughness and run the risk of 
amplifying both good and bad findings. Babcock (56), for 
instance, believes that "common sense suggests there are only 
so many ways to massage past price data. It should not be 
surprising that indicators of the same kind tend to give 
signals at about the same time." One of the canons of using 
technical analysis successfully is to combine several 
indicators, choosing ones that cancel out each other's 
negative features and yet leave the positive features 
undisturbed. Thus, having access to information itself does 
not help, one must be able to assess the information's 
importance and meaning to be able to "cash-in" on its worth. 
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So, is technical analysis a worthwhile task? Fama, 
(Behavior 35) helps to answer this question. Although 
speaking about the minimum acceptable level of dependence, his 
comment that it depends on the point of view being considered 
is also valid in relation to the concerns of the overall 
validity of technical analysis. This is where academicians 
and technicians understanding falls apart. For a statistician 
conducting tests on successive price changes, if the 
dependence can not account for the property being tested, then 
the assumption of independence can be justified. On the other 
hand, a technician will use very practical rules in 
determining dependence, such as can the knowledge of past 
price changes be used to increase return? The investor would 
"accept the theory of random walks as the better model if the 
actual degree of dependence cannot be used to produce greater 
expected profits than a buy-and-hold policy (Fama and Blume 
226). Thus, the trader's assessment of the importance and 
consequences of dependence is and always will be quite 
different from that of a statistician. 
Pruitt and White (Crisma 55) also note that most tests of 
specific trading techniques are usually indirect tests in that 
they do not actually measure the returns that are generated. 
The only way that a valid test of technical analysis can occur 
is if it is carried out, which is what I believe many large 
mutual funds do. 
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Some of the issues yet to be resolved before the question 
echnical analysis can be fully answered are: 
1. Does standard statistical testing 
adequately describe the market for 
investors? 
2. Do statistical methods adequately measure 
the data that technicians evaluate? 
3. Can the price patterns be modeled by 
simple linear relationships? 
4. Is equilibrium a range rather than a 
finite value? 
5. Does it pay for the average investor to 
expend resources searching out little 
known information? 
6. Do only certain types of stocks lend 
themselves to technical analysis? 
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APPENDIX A 
DATA ON INDIVIDUAL STOCKS 
AVON - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 24.38 10/03/88 $23.13 10/24/88 ($ 183) 
$ 20.00 12/27/88 21.38 03/27/89 $0.20 $25.00 105 
$ 23.25 04/03/89 33.63 07/24/89 1.74 25.00 1, 007 
$ 35.50 08/01/89 34.13 09/15/89 25.00 ( 170) 
$ 31.25 11/09/89 34.25 01/11/90 3.46 25.00 270 
$ 32.38 03/01/90 32.00 08/06/90 25.00 (71) 
$ 26.00 11/07/90 27.25 01/09/91 . 24 110.00 177 
$ 29.75 01/18/91 42.88 07/01/91 3.15 220.00 1, 478 
$ 44.75 07/12/91 44.63 09/05/91 110.00 40 
$ 44.88 10/17/91 41.13 10/29/91 ( 433) 
$ 39.50 12/13/91 45.50 03/10/92 2.74 35.00 580 
$ 46.25 03/30/92 49.00 06/10/92 1.19 35.00 253 
$ 51.50 06/29/92 51.00 08/17/92 40.00 ( 68) 
$ 52.25 09/10/92 55.38 12/09/92 3.00 40.00 298 
$ 57.25 01/19/93 63.87 03/17/93 40.00 644 
$3,928 
AVON - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE 
10/03/88 
INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 18.88 12/08/88 $ 20.75 01/27/89 $3.01 $ 132 
24.50 04/05/89 35.75 05/24/89 18.63 $25.00 1, 111 
36.50 08/02/89 36.00 08/21/89 25.00 ( 83) 
31.88 10/09/89 36.00 11/30/89 6.53 25.00 386 
32.88 02/05/90 34.00 03/29/90 1.85 56 
36.00 06/07/90 27.38 11/30/90 135.00 ( 785) 
29.50 01/21/91 43.25 03/06/91 42.90 110.00 1,470 
44.25 07/15/91 46.50 07/31/91 2.86 170 
44.38 09/23/91 47.13 01/20/92 10.56 35.00 263 
51.50 06/29/92 52.25 07/22/92 . 85 18 
50.88 09/08/92 53.50 10/05/92 5.41 209 
55.25 12/31/92 
03/17/93 
57.50 02/16/93 1.51 40.00 209 
$3,156 
77 
AVON - MACD 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 24.38 10/03/88 $ 23.50 10/19/88 ($ 146) 
19.63 12/21/88 21.50 03/22/89 $ 4.58 $25.00 159 
35.75 07/03/89 34.00 07/17/89 ( 233) 
36.50 08/02/89 35.88 09/11/89 25.00 ( 95) 
31.50 11/07/89 34.25 01/11/90 3.17 25.00 245 
32.38 03/01/90 35.25 05/29/90 . 90 25.00 255 
36.38 06/12/90 34.88 06/18/90 ( 208) 
36.75 06/29/90 33.88 08/03/90 ( 345) 
25.75 11/05/90 27.25 01/07/91 .47 110.00 202 
29.50 01/21/91 43.75 05/21/91 4.79 220.00 1, 592 
45.00 06/05/91 44.75 09/04/91 35.00 ( 48) 
45.13 10/18/91 46.25 02/20/92 . 19 70.00 124 
48.50 02/28/92 45.63 03/09/92 ( 345) 
46.25 03/30/92 49.00 06/10/92 1.19 35.00 253 
51.50 06/29/92 51.25 08/14/92 40.00 ( 43) 
52.25 09/11/92 56.38 12/08/92 4.06 40.00 399 
57.25 01/19/93 63.87 03/17/93 40.00 644 
$2,410 
AVON AVON 
BUY AND HOLD 
BEGIN PRICE = $ 24.38 
INVEST $ IN MM 
INVEST $2,438 
END PRICE = $ 63.87 AVG PRIME = .088 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $ 58 
MONTHS HELD = 54 
TOTAL DIVID = $ 900 
$4,791 $1,179 
78 
BOEING - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 28.00 10/03/88 $ 27.25 11/11/88 $19.50 ($ 114) 
28.00 12/07/88 27.13 12/16/88 ( 145) 
27.13 01/16/89 33.50 06/20/89 39.00 619 
34.13 06/27/89 32.38 06/29/89 $ . 92 ( 233) 
33.75 07/14/89 36.25 10/30/89 19.50 213 
39.63 11/20/89 38.63 01/26/90 1.20 ( 158) 
40.75 02/01/90 56.75 07/24/90 47.60 1,590 
59.25 07/27/90 55.75 08/01/90 . 77 ( 408) 
46.00 10/17/90 43.63 11/26/90 23.80 ( 271) 
46.13 12/06/90 46.13 02/26/91 25.00 ( 33) 
49.50 03/04/91 47.25 03/20/91 25.00 ( 258) 
48.88 04/05/91 45.88 04/29/91 ( 358) 
46.75 05/10/91 45.38 06/26/91 25.00 ( 170) 
45.50 08/05/91 48.25 10/09/91 .46 25.00 242 
50.00 10/17/91 45.13 11/15/91 25.00 ( 520) 
46.88 12/26/91 46.63 02/12/92 25.00 ( 58) 
46.25 04/14/92 43.75 05/01/92 ( 308) 
45.00 06/08/92 42.13 06/18/92 ( 345) 
40.25 08/07/92 38.50 08/21/92 25.00 ( 208) 
37.38 10/13/92 35.25 11/12/92 25.00 ( 246) 
34.75 12/16/92 36.13 01/22/93 1.69 82 
35.63 03/15/93 34.38 03/17/93 ( 183) 
($1,270) 
BOEING - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 28.00 10/03/88 $ 29.13 10/26/88 $ . 79 $ 56 
27.50 11/25/88 28.75 03/27/89 9.33 $19.50 96 
41.38 02/02/90 40.00 02/23/90 23.80 ( 172) 
49.25 05/04/90 59.00 06/21/90 12.40 23.80 953 
52.00 08/14/90 46.13 10/29/90 23.80 ( 621) 
49.13 04/04/91 49.38 09/17/91 . 52 50.00 18 
43.00 12/13/91 50.63 01/29/92 6.41 711 
46.63 03/05/92 37.50 01/14/93 75.00 ( 896) 
35.25 02/09/93 34.37 03/17/93 25.00 ( 121) 
$ 24 
79 
BUY $ BUY DATE 























BUY AND HOLD 
BEGIN PRICE = $ 28 
END PRICE = $ 34 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $ 58 
TOTAL DIVID = $423 
$1,003 
BOEING - MACD 
SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 28.00 11/10/88 $19.50 ($ 39) 
33.38 06/16/89 $ 3.49 39.00 522 
36.38 10/27/89 1.45 19.50 226 
38.88 12/21/89 ( 145) 
38.63 01/26/90 ( 295) 
46.38 04/30/90 .21 23.80 404 
55.75 08/01/90 12.37 23.80 665 
44.25 11/08/90 25.00 ( 146) 
44.25 11/21/90 ( 296) 
44.00 01/08/91 ( 271) 
46.13 02/26/91 25.00 ( 345) 
47.13 03/19/91 ( 370) 
47.38 04/10/91 ( 208) 
45.38 06/26/91 25.00 ( 195) 
48.25 10/09/91 . 79 25.00 268 
49.38 10/28/91 ( 108) 
46.63 02/12/92 1.86 25.00 94 
44.13 04/30/92 ( 358) 
43.75 06/16/92 ( 183) 
36.13 10/28/92 25.00 ( 395) 
36.13 01/22/93 .47 ( 20) 
34.37 03/17/93 ( 184) 
($1,379) 
BOEING 
INV AT PRIME 
INVEST $2,800 
38 AVG PRIME = .088 
MONTHS HELD = 54 
$1,354 
80 
BRISTOL MYERS - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 44.00 10/03/88 $ 42.63 10/08/88 ($ 195) 
42.88 11/25/88 44.00 01/23/89 $ . 05 $50.00 104 
45.13 01/26/89 44.88 03/07/89 ( 83) 
46.25 03/09/89 47.88 06/15/89 .43 50.00 155 
49.75 06/27/89 48.00 07/05/89 ( 233) 
49.38 07/10/89 48.25 08/02/89 ( 171) 
49.38 08/24/89 55.63 01/19/90 4.65 103.00 675 
53.00 02/20/90 52.50 02/21/90 ( 108) 
53.00 03/07/90 58.50 08/06/90 3.70 106.00 602 
61.50 09/04/90 60.00 09/18/90 ( 208) 
59.50 10/05/90 62.00 01/07/91 . 60 60.00 253 
67.00 01/18/91 75.25 04/29/91 .20 60.00 827 
78.25 05/01/91 77.75 06/28/91 60.00 ( 48) 
80.75 07/02/91 83.00 09/26/91 1.78 169 
84.50 10/30/91 81.25 11/20/91 ( 383) 
80.75 12/20/91 82.63 01/24/92 2.48 69.00 201 
80.00 03/20/92 77.50 04/01/92 69.00 ( 239) 
75.75 05/06/92 73.00 05/15/92 ( 333) 
66.25 07/09/92 66.50 08/31/92 . 02 ( 33) 
68.50 09/04/92 65.50 09/23/92 ( 358) 
65.00 10/21/92 65.00 01/05/93 72.00 14 
03/17/93 56.37 
$ 608 
BRISTOL MYERS - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 42.88 11/25/88 $ 45.25 12/27/88 $10.30 $50.00 $ 239 
49.75 06/27/89 48.25 08/01/89 ( 208 
48.88 08/23/89 49.50 09/15/89 2.17 6 
52.38 02/09/90 53.38 04/19/90 3.96 53.00 99 
60.25 10/02/90 67.13 12/21/90 4.46 634 
67.00 01/18/91 74.50 02/26/91 40.14 732 
81.50 10/08/91 85.50 01/17/92 1.82 69.00 413 
80.50 02/06/92 65.75 08/21/92 138.00 ( 1, 395 
67.50 09/02/92 67.75 12/28/92 .29 141.00 108 
56.50 02/16/93 56.37 03/17/93 ( 71 
$ 557 
81 
BUY $ BUY DATE 



















BUY AND HOLD 
BEGIN PRICE = $44 
END PRICE = $56.37 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $58 
TOTAL DIVID = $1,000 
BRISTOL MYERS - MACD 
SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 42.63 11/09/88 ($ 195) 
44.88 01/11/89 $ . 72 $50.00 193 
45.00 03/02/89 ( 121) 
47.88 06/15/89 . 51 50.00 156 
48.25 08/02/89 ( 96) 
54.88 01/16/90 4.49 103.00 599 
52.38 03/14/90 ( 120) 
52.63 04/24/90 53.00 ( 42) 
58.50 08/06/90 1.65 53.00 234 
62.50 01/08/91 .43 113.00 205 
75.50 04/25/91 1.98 60.00 829 
79.00 06/11/91 ( 58) 
82.75 09/26/91 2.18 219 
81.13 11/19/91 ( 408) 
82.63 01/24/92 . 91 69.00 112 
67.25 08/25/92 138.00 ( 1, 208) 
67.00 09/17/92 ( 208) 
67.50 12/31/92 2.70 72.00 167 
$ 258 
BRISTOL MYERS 
INVEST $ IN MM 
INVEST = $4,400 
AVG PRIME = .088 
MONTHS HELD =54 
$2,179 $2,127 
82 
COLGATE - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 22.25 10/03/88 $ 22.25 11/11/88 $19.00 ($ 39) 
22.88 12/06/88 22.25 02/27/89 19.00 ( 102) 
22.88 03/08/89 30.25 11/08/89 $ 1.06 58.00 738 
30.75 11/15/89 30.38 01/18/90 ( 95) 
29.38 03/08/90 28.50 04/11/90 ( 146) 
29.63 05/07/90 32.50 08/06/90 4.06 23.00 256 
31.75 10/05/90 30.75 10/10/90 ( 158) 
32.50 10/18/90 34.38 01/08/91 . 54 23.00 154 
35.63 01/21/91 34.13 01/29/91 23.00 ( 185) 
36.25 02/04/91 37.75 05/16/91 . 22 23.00 115 
39.75 05/23/91 38.50 06/21/91 ( 183) 
39.25 07/18/91 46.38 03/11/92 1.20 80.00 736 
46.88 03/19/92 50.13 06/17/92 . 86 27.00 295 
52.25 06/29/92 57.50 12/18/92 4.91 62.00 534 
56.75 01/27/93 65.63 03/17/93 830 
$2,750 
COLGATE - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 21.63 11/28/88 $ 22.75 12/27/88 $ 1.85 $ 56 
22.63 03/07/89 25.63 05/24/89 18.94 $19.00 280 
28.63 02/12/90 32.25 06/12/90 5.47 19.50 329 
34.63 08/15/90 34.63 11/14/90 22.50 ( 36) 
35.25 01/23/91 40.00 04/26/91 9.12 22.50 449 
38.00 07/16/91 43.75 10/15/91 35.60 26.50 579 
51.75 06/30/92 55.88 09/03/92 13.08 31.00 399 
56.13 01/14/93 57.63 02/18/93 31.00 123 
$2,179 
83 
COLGATE - MACD 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 22.25 10/03/88 $ 22.25 11/11/88 $19.00 ($ 39) 
22.88 12/06/88 22.88 02/16/89 19.50 ( 39) 
23.00 03/10/89 30.00 11/06/89 $2.86 58.00 703 
31.50 11/24/89 30.75 12/26/89 ( 133) 
31.88 01/02/90 30.75 01/09/90 ( 171) 
29.00 03/09/90 28.50 04/11/90 ( 108) 
29.50 05/08/90 32.50 08/06/90 4.25 22.50 269 
31.75 10/05/90 34.38 01/08/91 1.70 22.50 229 
36.75 02/05/91 38.25 05/15/91 .43 26.50 119 
40.50 05/28/91 38.75 06/10/91 ( 233) 
39.50 07/19/91 40.25 10/25/91 . 32 53.00 70 
42.38 11/13/91 40.25 11/20/91 ( 271) 
42.25 11/29/91 46.63 02/18/92 . 84 26.50 407 
48.25 02/27/92 46.13 03/05/92 ( 270) 
48.00 03/23/92 49.25 06/18/92 .33 31.00 98 
51.75 06/30/92 57.25 11/10/92 . 66 62.00 555 
59.13 11/16/92 57.50 12/11/92 ( 221) 
56.75 01/28/93 65.63 03/17/93 31.00 861 
$1,826 
COLGATE 
BUY AND HOLD 
COLGATE 
INVEST $ IN MM 
BEGIN PRICE = $22.25 
END PRICE = $65.63 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $58 
TOTAL DIVID = $486 
INVEST = $2,225 
AVG PRIME = .088 
MONTHS HELD = 54 
$4,766 $1,076 
84 
EDISON - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 14.63 10/03/88 $ 30.75 10/24/89 $ 7.35 $90.00 $1,651 
31.38 11/13/89 30.38 12/19/89 26.00 ( 132) 
32.13 12/27/89 29.50 01/25/90 ( 321) 
32.50 02/12/90 40.00 07/31/90 21.42 52.00 765 
21.25 11/28/90 37.75 07/25/91 60.59 78.00 1,731 
31.88 12/26/91 37.00 06/08/92 . 74 56.00 511 
37.13 06/15/92 36.13 06/17/92 ( 158) 
37.50 06/24/92 44.75 12/22/92 3.48 59.00 729 
45.00 01/12/93 44.00 02/12/93 ( 158) 
43.38 03/12/93 43.25 03/17/93 ( 71) 
$4,547 
EDISON - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 14.63 10/03/88 $ 15.75 11/17/88 $ . 65 $ 55 
16.13 12/12/88 18.88 02/15/89 17.56 $22.50 257 
30.75 11/09/89 33.25 12/13/89 1.26 193 
32.25 01/04/90 31.25 02/27/90 26.00 ( 132) 
38.25 05/15/90 44.00 06/18/90 3.73 26.00 547 
47.50 07/16/90 22.25 12/27/90 52.00 ( 2, 531) 
24.00 01/17/91 29.75 02/14/91 24.84 542 
39.75 08/14/91 34.63 01/14/92 54.00 ( 516) 
36.38 06/11/92 39.00 07/20/92 10.63 215 
44.38 01/06/93 44.75 02/11/93 . 22 ( 21) 
43.38 03/09/93 43.25 03/17/93 
($1,391) 
85 
BUY $ BUY DATE 















BUY AND HOLD 
BEGIN PRICE = $ 14 
END PRICE = $ 43 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $ 58 
TOTAL DIVID = $472 
EDISON - MACD 
SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 32.00 10/20/89 $10.37 $90.00 $1,642 
30.38 12/19/89 26.00 ( 257) 
30.75 01/24/90 ( 183) 
35.13 05/07/90 26.00 269 
25.50 07/06/90 . 50 26.00 ( 1,307) 
43.00 07/24/90 ( 483) 
22.25 01/10/91 . 17 26.00 68 
37.75 07/25/91 22.77 52.00 1,392 
36.50 03/17/92 . 34 56.00 48 
36.00 04/21/92 ( 221) 
37.00 05/27/92 28.00 ( 130) 
45.50 12/18/92 4.61 59.00 718 
44.00 02/12/93 ( 246) 
43.25 03/17/93 ( 71) 
$1,239 
EDISON 
INVEST $ IN MM 
63 INVEST $1,463 
25 AVG PRIME = .088 
MONTHS HELD =54 
$3,276 $707 
86 
HERSHEY - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 25.00 10/03/88 $ 25.75 11/10/88 $ .49 $ 17 
25.25 12/08/88 25.00 02/27/89 $19.00 ( 64) 
26.13 03/06/89 31.75 08/17/89 1.48 19.00 524 
33.00 08/29/89 31.88 09/13/89 ( 170) 
33.00 09/20/89 33.88 01/12/90 1.16 25.00 56 
31.50 03/09/90 31.25 04/27/90 ( 83) 
32.25 04/30/90 35.25 08/06/90 . 50 25.00 268 
37.50 08/14/90 35.00 08/17/90 ( 308) 
38.00 08/31/90 35.38 09/20/90 ( 320) 
37.88 10/01/90 35.38 10/16/90 ( 308) 
36.75 10/19/90 35.13 10/23/90 ( 220) 
35.75 11/12/90 34.63 11/23/90 23.00 ( 147) 
34.88 11/30/90 36.00 01/08/91 . 22 54 
38.38 01/17/91 41.50 06/18/91 1.42 45.00 300 
42.00 07/08/91 40.50 07/11/91 ( 208) 
42.13 07/18/91 40.88 07/24/91 ( 183) 
41.88 07/31/91 40.75 08/19/91 ( 171) 
41.75 08/22/91 40.38 09/05/91 ( 195) 
39.75 10/14/91 37.25 11/21/91 25.00 ( 283) 
40.00 12/16/91 41.13 01/31/92 . 11 55 
43.88 02/05/92 42.13 02/27/92 25.00 ( 208) 
40.75 04/22/92 39.75 05/14/92 ( 158) 
40.88 06/01/92 53.38 03/17/93 81.00 1,273 
($ 479) 
HERSHEY - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 25.00 10/03/88 $ 26.88 11/01/88 $ 1.58 $ 132 
25.50 12/07/88 28.13 05/01/89 7.64 $18.50 231 
33.00 08/31/89 34.00 10/16/89 2.76 45 
31.75 02/09/90 31.25 03/27/90 24.80 ( 83 
37.88 10/01/90 38.25 12/26/90 .20 22.50 2 
39.38 01/18/91 40.38 02/13/91 3.38 45 
42.00 07/05/91 40.25 10/25/91 24.50 ( 209 
37.75 12/02/91 43.63 01/14/92 10.58 541 
40.25 03/30/92 42.75 07/23/92 14.16 24.50 231 
$ 935 
87 
BUY $ BUY DATE 


























BUY AND HOLD 
BEGIN PRICE = $ 25 
END PRICE = $ 53 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $ 58 
TOTAL DIVID = $423 
HERSHEY - MACD 
SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 25, .38 11/11/88 $ .27 ($ 20) 
25 , . 25 01/24/89 ( 96) 
25 , . 00 02/27/89 $18 . 50 ( 153) 
25 , .38 03/21/89 ( 158) 
32 , .38 08/16/89 2 . 12 18 . 50 551 
32 , .63 09/06/89 ( 120) 
34 , .38 01/11/90 2 .48 24 .80 157 
31. . 75 04/26/90 . 02 ( 46) 
36 , . 00 08/07/90 1, . 94 24 . 80 269 
36 . . 50 09/07/90 ( 108) 
35 , . 75 10/12/90 ( 158) 
34 , . 63 11/21/90 22 . 50 ( 136) 
35 . . 13 01/01/91 ( 183) 
38 . . 88 03/18/91 22 . 50 ( 86) 
40 , . 13 04/30/91 ( 58) 
41 , . 50 06/18/91 22 . 50 ( 74) 
41 , . 25 08/13/91 ( 108) 
40 , .38 09/05/91 ( 208) 
37 . 25 11/21/91 24 . 50 ( 284) 
41, . 13 01/31/92 . 16 55 
42 . . 13 02/27/92 24 . 50 ( 184) 
40 , .25 05/12/92 ( 71) 
42 . . 50 08/26/92 . 34 27 . 00 206 
45 . . 75 12/16/92 . 05 27 . 00 194 
53 . 38 03/17/93 27 . 00 507 
($ 312) 
HERSHEY 
INVEST $ IN MM 
00 INVEST - $2,500 
38 AVG PRIME = .088 




LOEWS - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 79.00 10/03/88 $ 74.75 11/11/88 $25.00 ($ 458) 
77.00 11/30/88 115.00 12/20/89 $11.86 100.00 3, 854 
126.25 01/03/90 118.25 01/09/90 ( 858) 
105.75 03/16/90 106.75 05/07/90 . 14 25.00 67 
111.25 05/14/90 110.00 06/28/90 ( 183) 
87.50 11/09/90 88.50 01/09/91 . 19 42 
96.00 01/18/91 101.75 04/10/91 . 83 25.00 542 
107.75 04/17/91 104.00 05/07/91 25.00 ( 408) 
101.63 06/03/91 100.13 06/19/91 ( 208) 
100.88 07/10/91 100.25 08/02/91 ( 121) 
103.13 08/07/91 104.00 10/09/91 . 54 30 
106.38 11/05/91 104.13 12/13/91 ( 283) 
108.38 12/26/91 106.75 01/30/92 ( 221) 
109.25 02/12/92 106.88 02/18/92 ( 295) 
107.88 03/04/92 106.63 04/07/92 ( 183) 
108.50 04/14/92 109.00 06/26/92 . 11 25.00 17 
114.13 07/06/92 115.25 08/28/92 . 70 25.00 80 
117.50 09/24/92 113.13 10/16/92 ( 495) 
117.38 11/09/92 114.00 01/07/93 ( 396) 
$ 523 
LOEWS - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 79.00 10/03/88 $ 79.00 10/17/88 ($ 58) 
76.00 12/02/88 78.50 02/10/89 $13.62 $25.00 231 
121.75 09/26/89 121.75 10/17/89 ( 58) 
124.75 01/02/90 108.25 04/24/90 25.00 ( 1,683) 
113.00 05/15/90 118.00 06/04/90 10.92 453 
93.75 09/04/90 93.25 12/07/90 25.00 ( 83) 
96.75 01/22/91 102.50 02/21/91 6.49 25.00 548 
101.75 04/10/91 105.88 10/08/91 2.58 50.00 408 
105.75 11/04/91 103.88 11/21/91 25.00 ( 220) 
109.00 12/30/91 109.50 01/20/92 .20 ( 8) 
107.25 02/07/92 112.00 06/18/92 1.94 25.00 444 
114.00 07/06/92 114.50 07/27/92 . 66 ( 7) 
115.00 09/21/92 117.75 10/09/92 1.72 219 
115.50 11/05/92 104.63 03/17/93 25.00 ( 1,120) 
($ 934) 
89 
LOEWS - MACD 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 79.00 10/03/88 $ 74.75 11/11/88 $25.00 ($ 458) 
75.50 12/08/88 114.50 09/15/89 $9.36 75.00 3, 926 
122.00 09/26/89 115.00 12/20/89 25.00 ( 733) 
124.50 01/04/90 107.25 05/04/90 50.00 ( 1, 733) 
113.00 05/15/90 110.75 06/26/90 ( 283) 
84.50 11/08/90 88.50 01/09/91 1.15 343 
96.75 01/22/91 103.75 03/28/91 3.36 25.00 670 
108.00 04/18/91 102.00 05/07/91 25.00 ( 633) 
102.50 05/31/91 101.63 06/14/91 ( 145) 
102.38 07/15/91 100.75 07/26/91 ( 221) 
102.13 08/08/91 104.13 10/11/91 1.15 25.00 168 
106.38 11/05/91 105.25 11/22/91 ( 171) 
106.50 11/29/91 104.00 12/13/91 ( 308) 
107.75 12/27/91 106.75 01/30/92 ( 158) 
107.88 03/04/92 107.13 03/17/92 ( 133) 
111.75 04/16/92 109.25 06/25/92 25.00 ( 283) 
115.25 07/07/92 115.25 08/28/92 25.00 ( 33) 
120.25 09/25/92 115.00 10/19/92 ( 583) 
117.38 11/09/92 114.00 01/07/93 ( 396) 
105.75 03/12/93 104.63 03/17/93 ( 170) 
($1,334; 
LOEWS 
BUY AND HOLD 
BEGIN PRICE = $ 79.00 
END PRICE = $104.63 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $ 58 
TOTAL DIVID = $475 
$2,980 
LOEWS 
INVEST $ IN MM 
INVEST = $7,900 
AVG PRIME = .088 
MONTHS HELD = 54 
$3,819 
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PHILLIP MORRIS - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 24.25 10/03/88 $ 23.25 11/10/88 ($ 158) 
24.00 11/23/88 38.88 09/25/89 $ .36 126.00 1, 556 
40.13 09/27/89 40.75 11/07/89 . 07 4 
42.13 11/13/89 40.75 11/14/89 ( 196) 
42.13 11/29/89 40.13 12/20/89 37.00 ( 221) 
42.75 01/02/90 40.00 01/11/90 ( 333) 
39.25 02/15/90 37.75 02/20/90 ( 208) 
38.00 03/15/90 46.50 08/03/90 9.18 37.00 838 
45.13 09/18/90 44.63 09/26/90 ( 108) 
45.25 09/28/90 65.75 05/16/91 3.44 91.00 2, 086 
67.50 05/24/91 63.00 06/25/91 46.00 ( 462) 
65.50 07/05/91 69.00 10/23/91 3.28 53.00 348 
69.00 12/02/91 74.38 02/11/92 2.07 53.00 535 
76.50 02/28/92 74.25 05/26/92 53.00 ( 230) 
77.75 07/02/92 81.50 10/07/92 3.51 65.00 386 
79.38 11/16/92 77.13 12/15/92 65.00 ( 218) 
78.25 12/28/92 76.25 01/04/93 ( 258) 
75.75 02/01/93 70.50 02/16/93 ( 583) 
$2,778 
PHILLIP MORRIS - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 24.00 11/23/88 $ 24.25 12/13/88 $ 1.73 $29.80 ($ 1) 
41.13 09/29/89 44.38 10/20/89 5.85 273 
41.88 01/04/90 42.13 04/25/90 . 67 36.50 4 
47.25 08/15/90 50.88 12/28/90 1.74 45.50 352 
52.50 01/18/91 67.00 03/08/91 40.37 45.50 1,478 
65.25 07/03/91 73.50 08/27/91 15.25 782 
70.50 11/13/91 77.25 01/20/92 2.59 52.50 672 
78.00 02/06/92 77.75 07/23/92 105.00 22 
77.25 10/29/92 64.25 03/17/93 130.00 ( 1,228) 
$2,354 
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BUY $ BUY DATE 





















BUY AND HOLD 
BEGIN PRICE = $ 24 
END PRICE = $ 64 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $ 58 
TOTAL DIVID = $822 
PHILLIP MORRIS - MACD 
SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 23.75 10/28/88 ($ 108) 
39.50 09/20/89 $3.00 125.80 1, 633 
40.88 11/07/89 ( 83) 
40.13 12/20/89 36.50 ( 284) 
39.75 01/10/90 ( 421) 
44.00 08/06/90 5.67 558 
48.50 10/18/90 73.00 292 
46.80 01/09/91 ( 171) 
66.50 05/14/91 4.37 45.50 1, 392 
66.25 06/06/91 45.50 ( 333) 
71.25 10/07/91 1.08 558 
68.75 10/23/91 52.50 ( 546) 
74.38 02/11/92 1.31 285 
74.38 03/05/92 ( 295) 
75.75 04/09/92 ( 146) 
75.75 04/24/92 ( 371) 
76.00 05/22/92 ( 283) 
82.75 10/08/92 4.56 65.00 512 
76.25 12/16/92 65.00 ( 318) 
64.25 03/17/93 65.00 ( 1, 118) 
$ 753 
PHILLIP MORRIS 
INVEST $ IN MM 
25 INVEST - $2,425 
25 AVG PRIME = .088 




PHILLIP'S PETROLEUM - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE MM INC DIVID STK INC 
$ 18.25 10/03/88 $ 19.00 11/08/88 $ .29 $26.00 $ 43 
20.13 11/25/88 22.25 07/05/89 .20 51.00 205 
23.13 07/10/89 22.38 08/02/89 ( 133) 
23.13 08/08/89 23.25 10/13/89 . 14 ( 46) 
23.50 11/30/89 23.88 01/15/90 . 15 ( 20) 
25.63 02/01/90 24.75 03/22/90 28.00 ( 118) 
25.75 03/27/90 24.75 04/19/90 ( 158) 
25.35 05/02/90 25.63 06/18/90 . 09 28.00 ( 2) 
26.00 07/02/90 27.38 08/27/90 .26 28.00 108 
28.75 09/05/90 27.25 09/26/90 ( 208) 
26.63 11/05/90 25.50 11/07/90 ( 171) 
26.50 11/09/90 25.13 12/11/90 ( 195) 
26.13 12/19/90 24.88 01/04/91 ( 183) 
26.25 01/25/91 27.13 04/09/91 . 02 28.00 58 
28.25 04/11/91 27.38 05/03/91 ( 145) 
26.88 06/05/91 26.25 06/18/91 ( 121) 
26.63 07/17/91 25.38 08/13/91 28.00 ( 155) 
26.00 08/27/91 26.00 11/06/91 28.00 ( 30) 
24.00 12/31/91 22.75 02/05/92 28.00 ( 155) 
23.50 03/12/92 22.50 04/02/92 ( 158) 
23.88 04/03/92 25.00 06/29/92 . 22 28.00 82 
26.63 07/08/92 27.00 10/06/92 . 58 28.00 8 
24.38 12/11/92 24.88 03/17/93 28.00 20 
($1,474) 
PHILLIP'S PETROLEUM - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 19.50 11/23/88 $ 20.50 01/30/89 $ 2.66 $ 45 
23.13 05/22/89 27.50 09/07/89 24.86 $28.00 432 
25.38 05/03/90 26.38 05/30/90 3.46 28.00 73 
25.50 10/22/90 26.00 02/22/91 1.16 56.00 49 
27.50 05/31/91 25.63 09/12/91 28.00 ( 217 
22.25 12/17/91 27.50 07/29/92 11.09 56.00 534 
25.63 10/26/92 26.50 02/17/93 . 56 56.00 86 
$1,002 
93 
PHILLIP'S PETROLEUM - MACD 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 18.25 10/03/88 $ 19.00 11/08/88 $ . 34 $25.60 $ 43 
19.75 11/28/88 19.38 12/27/88 ( 95) 
20.63 01/06/89 22.63 05/11/89 . 53 51.20 194 
22.88 05/23/89 22.88 06/12/89 ( 58) 
23.63 07/12/89 22.50 08/01/89 ( 171) 
23.88 08/11/89 25.00 10/16/89 1.21 55 
23.88 12/01/89 23.88 01/15/90 ( 58) 
25.63 02/01/90 25.38 03/20/90 28.00 ( 55) 
26.38 04/02/90 24.75 04/19/90 ( 221) 
26.13 05/08/90 25.63 06/18/90 ( 108) 
26.00 07/05/90 27.88 08/28/90 .41 28.00 158 
28.88 09/07/90 28.25 09/12/90 ( 121) 
29.25 09/17/90 26.00 09/27/90 ( 383) 
26.00 11/06/90 25.38 12/10/90 28.00 ( 92) 
26.25 12/24/90 24.88 01/04/91 ( 195) 
26.25 01/25/91 27.50 04/08/91 .24 28.00 95 
28.88 04/17/91 27.25 05/02/91 ( 221) 
26.63 06/04/91 26.25 06/12/91 ( 96) 
26.63 07/18/91 25.38 08/12/91 28.00 ( 155) 
26.50 08/29/91 25.63 09/16/91 ( 145) 
25.88 09/26/91 25.88 10/08/91 ( 58) 
27.13 10/14/91 25.63 11/07/91 28.00 ( 180) 
23.50 12/30/91 22.75 01/10/92 ( 133) 
24.38 01/15/92 22.75 02/05/92 28.00 ( 193) 
23.75 03/13/92 22.50 04/02/92 ( 183) 
24.75 04/06/92 25.00 06/29/92 . 05 28.00 ( 5) 
26.50 07/09/92 27.13 09/21/92 . 12 28.00 33 
27.50 09/30/92 27.38 10/05/92 ( 70) 
24.38 12/11/92 24.88 03/17/93 28.00 20 
($2, 398) 
PHILLIP'S PETROLEUM PHILLIP'S PETROLEUM 
BUY AND HOLD INVEST $ IN MM 
BEGIN PRICE = $ 18.25 INVEST = $1,825 
END PRICE $ 24.88 AVG PRIME = .088 
100 SHARES MONTHS HELD = 54 
TRAN COST $ 58 
TOTAL DIVID = $ 496.80 
$1,102 $ 882 
94 
SERVICE MASTER - MOVING AVERAGE 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 16.13 10/03/88 $ 16.25 10/07/88 $ . 01 ($ 46) 
16.50 10/10/88 15.75 10/17/88 ( 133) 
15.63 01/10/89 15.25 02/14/89 ( 96) 
16.13 02/16/89 15.25 03/03/89 ( 146) 
15.13 04/19/89 14.63 04/26/89 ( 108) 
15.13 05/01/89 15.38 07/27/89 . 07 $29.00 ( 4) 
15.50 08/09/89 15.25 08/28/89 ( 83) 
14.88 11/24/89 14.25 12/19/89 ( 121) 
14.75 01/05/90 14.13 01/19/90 30.00 ( 90) 
14.50 02/09/90 13.75 03/23/90 ( 133) 
13.63 05/15/90 14.63 08/17/90 . 62 30.00 73 
14.63 09/13/90 14.63 10/12/90 30.00 ( 28) 
14.25 11/13/90 18.63 06/12/91 2.31 96.00 478 
19.75 07/05/91 25.13 03/04/92 7.88 80.00 568 
24.00 05/05/92 24.00 06/24/92 ( 58) 
25.13 06/29/92 27.38 09/21/92 1.62 32.00 201 
27.25 10/22/92 27.38 12/22/92 . 05 ( 45) 
27.88 01/08/93 27.25 02/16/93 33.00 ( 88) 
27.88 03/04/93 28.87 03/17/93 41 
$ 182 
SERVICE MASTER - WILDER'S RELATIVE STRENGTH 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL : DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 15.38 01 05 89 $ 15.50 06 14 89 $ . 58 $58.60 $ 13 
14.63 01 04 90 14.75 06 12 90 . 25 60.60 15 
14.00 09 07 90 15.25 12 20 90 5.61 30.30 103 
18.13 06 26 91 21.25 09 30 91 13.33 96.00 363 
23.38 03 27 92 24.88 05 27 92 .47 32.00 124 
24.63 06 10 92 26.75 07 31 92 4.07 32.00 190 
27.00 10 20 92 28.38 11 11 92 1.82 82 
27.50 01 06 93 28.88 03 17 93 33.00 113 
$1,003 
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SERVICE MASTER - MACD 
BUY $ BUY DATE SELL $ SELL DATE INC MM DIVID STK INC 
$ 16.13 10/03/88 $ 16.13 10/07/88 ($ 58) 
16.13 10/12/88 16.13 10/14/88 ( 58) 
15.75 01/11/89 15.25 02/14/89 ( 108) 
16.00 02/17/89 15.50 03/02/89 ( 108) 
16.00 04/19/89 14.75 04/25/89 ( 183) 
15.00 05/02/89 15.38 07/13/89 $ . 05 $29.30 9 
15.63 07/20/89 15.38 07/27/89 ( 83) 
15.63 08/17/89 15.25 08/28/89 ( 96) 
14.88 11/24/89 14.25 12/19/89 ( 121) 
14.75 01/05/90 14.38 01/12/90 30.30 ( 65) 
14.50 02/09/90 13.75 03/23/90 ( 133) 
13.88 05/16/90 14.38 08/20/90 .29 30.30 23 
9.88 09/14/90 9.25 09/28/90 ( 121) 
9.75 10/05/90 9.25 10/10/90 ( 108) 
9.63 11/14/90 9.75 01/16/91 . 03 48.00 2 
10.50 01/28/91 18.63 06/12/91 4.29 48.00 807 
13.25 07/05/91 16.25 03/05/92 3.82 80.00 326 
15.50 04/28/92 24.25 06/25/92 . 84 818 
26.00 06/30/92 27.38 09/21/92 . 99 81 
27.25 10/22/92 27.88 12/18/92 .30 5 
27.88 01/08/93 27.00 02/17/93 33.00 ( 113) 
28.00 03/05/93 28.88 03/17/93 30 
$ 746 
SERVICE MASTER 
BUY AND HOLD 
SERVICE MASTER 
INVEST $ IN MM 
BEGIN PRICE = $ 16.13 
END PRICE = $ 28.87 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $ 58 
TOTAL DIVID = $ 591.40 
INVEST = $1,613 
AVG PRIME = .088 
MONTHS HELD = 54 
$1,807 $ 780 
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Formulas 
INC MM = Income on stock gain invested at average prime rate 
Stock * .088 * # days invested 
Gain 365 at avg prime rate 
# DAYS INVESTED AT AVG PRIME = Buy Date - Last Sell date - 1 
STOCK INCOME = Gain or Loss, including dividends, less 
transaction costs, plus income (using average prime rate) 
on gain figured for time period not in market. 
(Sell$ - Buy$)*100 + Inc MM + Dividends - Tran Cost 
BUY AND HOLD INCOME = Income for full time period, including 
dividends, less transaction costs. 
(Price Mar. 17, 1993 - Price Oct. 3, 1988) * 100 - 
Transaction Cost + Dividends 
INCOME IF INVESTED AT AVG PRIME FOR FULL TIME PERIOD = 
Income if invested amount required to buy 100 shares of 
stock on October 3, 1988. Used average prime rate, 
compounded monthly. 
(Beginning Price * 100) * (1.00733^54) 
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APPENDIX B 









Avon $3,928 $3,156 $2,410 $4,791 $1,179 
Boeing (1,270) 24 (1,379) 1,003 1,354 
Bristol-Myers 608 557 258 2,179 2,127 
Colgate 2,750 2,179 1,826 4,766 1,076 
Edison Brothers 4,547 (1,391) 1,239 3,276 707 
Hershey (479) 935 312 3,204 1,209 
Loews 523 (934) (1,134) 2,980 3,819 
Phillip Morris 2,778 2,354 753 4,764 1,172 
Phil. Petroleum (1,474) 1,003 (2,398) 1,102 882 
Service Master 182 1,004 746 1,807 780 
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BUY $ BUY DATE 



















BUY AND HOLD 
BEGIN PRICE = $44 
END PRICE = $56.37 
100 SHARES 
TRAN COST = $58 
TOTAL DIVID = $1,000 
BRISTOL MYERS - 
SELL $ SELL DATE 



















INC MM DIVID STK INC 
($ 195) 
$ . 72 $50.00 193 
( 121) 
. 51 50.00 156 
( 96) 
4.49 103.00 599 
( 120) 
53.00 ( 42) 
1.65 53.00 234 
.43 113.00 205 




. 91 69.00 112 
138.00 ( 1, 208) 
( 208) 
2.70 72.00 167 
$ 258 
BRISTOL MYERS 
INVEST $ IN MM 
INVEST = $4,400 
AVG PRIME = .088 
MONTHS HELD =54 
$2,179 $2,127 
